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RAouL BERGER*
I. INTRODUCTION
Lawrence Sager's seventy-page, densely packed assault upon "court-
stripping," ' which he labels as an attempt to "neuter" 2 (i.e., castrate) the Court, is
written in an "icily abstract ' 3 vacuum, virtually ignoring the ongoing debate4 about
what activist Louis Lusky admiringly describes as the Court's "assertion of the
power to revise the Constitution," and to repudiate "the limits on judicial review."- 5
Although Sager recognizes that "court-stripping" proposals "are the product of deep
hostility... [in] the nation" 6 to the school prayer, mandatory busing and similar
decisions, he lamely renders the impetus for this development as differences with the
Court's "erroneous interpretations of the Constitution," 7 when they involve nothing
less, as Philip Kurland wrote, than the Court's "usurpation of general governmental
powers on the pretext that its authority derives from the Fourteenth Amendment. "8
Instead, therefore, of an attempted rape of a vestal virgin, the "stripping" measures
constitute the sovereign people's attempt to "curb a judiciary run amok" 9 and to
restore their right to self-government-for example, to reinstate their unrestricted
right to enact death penalties, a right that never had been questioned prior to 1972.10
This it is that Sager condemns as a "tawdry precedent [for] sabotaging the integrity of
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I. Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress' Authority to Regu-
late the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17 (1981). For a critique of the article, see Redish,
Constitutional Limitations on Congressional Power to Control Federal Jurisdiction: A Reaction to Professor Sager, 77
Nw. U.L. REV. 143 (1982).
2. Sager, supra note 1, at 20.
3. Id. at 72.
4. Some of the articles are collated in Perry, Interpretivism, Freedom of Expression, and Equal Protection, 42
OHIO ST. L.J. 261, 285 n.100 (1981). For evaluation of the debate, see Bridwell, The Scope of Judicial Reriew:A Dirge
for the Theorists of Majority Rule? 31 S.C.L. REv. 617 (1980); Gangi, Judicial Expansionism: An Evaluation of the
Ongoing Debate, 8 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 1 (1981).
5. Lusky, Book Review, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 403, 406 (1979).
6. Sager, supra note I, at 18.
7. Id.
8. Letter to Harvard University Press (August 15, 1977) (available in Ohio State University Law Library).
9. Sager, supra note 1, at 38.
10. R. BRGER, DEATH PENALTIES: THE SUPRFME COURT'S OBSTACLE COURSE 1-2 (1982) [hereinafter cited as R.
BERGER, DEATH PENALTIES]. Of the same nature is Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), cited by Sager, supra
note 1, at 70 n.159. There the Court, overturning a centuries old practice, held that the "right to travel" entitles an
indigent migrant to immediate support at the terminus. An advocate of an unrestricted right to travel, Zechariah Chafee,
said, "[T]here is a queer uncertainty about what clause in the Constitution established this right." Z. CHAFEE, THREE
HU.IAN RiGHTs IN THE CONS'rION OF 1787, at 188 (1956). For 600 years the "right to travel" had been limited by a
sovereign right to exclude paupers, recognized in the prior decisions of the Court. Berger, Residence Requirements for
Welfare and Voting: A Post-Mortem, 42 OHIo ST. L.J. 853 (1982).
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the judicial process." 1 Respect for the "integrity of the judicial process," however,
requires that the Court stay within the confines the Framers contemplated, for "in-
tegrity" is defined as "uncorrupted condition; original perfect state.' 12 More than
"integrity of the judicial process" is involved. At issue is the integrity of our demo-
cratic system, whereunder the people have delegated law-making power to elected,
accountable officials, not to life-tenured judges who are all but unaccountable, 13
reserving to themselves the power to amend the Constitution. In short, Sager has
performed Hamlet without the Dane.
Lest the reader too hastily conclude that the foregoing is the product of an
overheated imagination, let me adduce some activist statements. Michael Perry con-
cluded that "[t]here is no plausible textual or historical justification for constitutional
policymaking by the judiciary." 14 Although Chief Justice Warren declared that the
"provisions of the Constitution" are "the rules of government' ' 15 and that "[w]e
cannot push back the limits of the Constitution ... [but] must apply those limits as
the Constitution prescribes them,"1 6 his worshipful biographer and former clerk, G.
Edward White, tells us that "Warren was never concerned with constitutional text or
intention. Rather, he believed that his job as judge lay in discovering and articulating
the 'ethical imperatives' he felt were (or should be) embedded in the Constitution."' 7
Paul Brest, a flaming apostle of activism, boldly challenged the assumption that
"judges ... [are] bound by the text or the original understanding of the Con-
stitution, "18 notwithstanding they are sworn to support it.19 But he has since adjured
academe "simply to acknowledge that most of our writings [about judicial review]
are not political theory but advocacy scholarship-amicus briefs ultimately designed
to persuade the Court to adopt our various notions of the public good." 2 0 Of all this,
11. Sager, supra note I, at 89.
12. 5 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 368 (Murray ed. 1933).
13. We "are philosophically [and historically] committed," Perry observes, to the "principle that governmental
policymaking... ought to be subject to control by persons accountable to the electorate." This principle is "axiomatic;
it is judicial review, not the principle, that requires justification." M. PERRY, THE CONsrTTTION, THE COURTs, AND
HUMAN RIGHTs 9 (1982) (footnotes omitted).
14. Id. at 24. In the face of pronouncements such as Kurland's, see supra text accompanying note 8, of Perry, and of
a broad activist consensus that modem "constitutional rights" of individuals have no constitutional footing, see infra note
44, Sager refers to "allegedly erroneous decisions that [Senator Jesse Helms] regards as judicial usurpation of power."
Sager, supra note 1, at 19 n.5 (emphasis added). An ardent activist, Paul Brest now acknowledges that "[flundamental
rights adjudication is open to the criticisms that it is not authorized and not guided by the text and original history of the
Constitution." Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative Constitutional
Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1082 (1981) (emphasis in original).
15. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 103 (1958).
16. Id. at 104.
17. McDowell, Book Review, Wall St. J., Aug. 26, 1982, at 20, col. 3 (emphasis added). This is Gary McDowell's
summary of White's exposition. It is richly confirmed by White's narrative. See G. WHrrE, EARL WARREN: A PuBLIc
LImR (1982). See also infra text accompanying notes 219-97.
18. Brest, The Mi~conceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REv. 204, 224 (1980).
19. Chief Justice Marshall asked, "Why does a judge swear to discharge his duties agreably to the constitution of the
United States, if that constitution forms no rule for his government?" Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 180
(1803).
20. Brest, supra note 14, at 1109.
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and of activist scrambling to rationalize the Court's exercise of extraconstitutional
power and policy making,2 1 there is scarcely an intimation in Sager's article.
Sager notices that there are opponents of his view, among them Herbert
Wechsler, a seminal scholar in the field, who deserves more than mere mention in a
footnote.' Wechsler concluded that "Congress has the power by enactment of a
statute to strike at what it deems judicial excess by delimitations of the jurisdiction"
of the federal courts. 23 The constitutional plan, he added, "was quite simply that the
Congress would decide from time to time how far the federal judicial institution
should be used within the limits of the federal judicial power.''24 To this may be
added the comment of a redoubtable activist, Charles Black: "I am not sure that I
could defend, as consistent with the postulates of democracy, a system which really
did put nine men, with life tenure, in an absolutely invulnerable position of final
power,"25 a view in which Michael Perry concurs.26 Black could avouch Alexander
Hamilton who, in Federalist No. 81,27 rejected the argument that the "usurpations of
the Supreme Court ... will be uncontrollable and remediless" as based upon "false
reasoning. "28 He went on to declare that "usurpations on the authority of the legisla-
ture" could be checked by impeachment.29 But the fact that impeachment provides
an alternate remedy does not reduce the provisions of article III to surplusage,
particularly because, as James Bryce observed, impeachment is so heavy a "piece of
artillery" as "to be unfit for ordinary use" 3 0 -a good reason for giving effect to the
unequivocal provisions of article Il.
21. See Symposium: Judicial Review Versus Democracy, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1981); Symposium: Constitutional
Adjudication andDemocratic Theory, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 259 (1981). MarkTushnet considers that the academicians seek
to "superimpose a facade of rationality on the Court's decisions." Tushnet, Truth, Justice, and the American Way: An
Interpretation of Public Law Scholarship in the Seventies, 57 Tax. L. REv. 1307, 1325 (1979). After examining "seven
representative scholars who favor one or another form of fundamental rights adjudication," Brest indicates that their
conclusions derived from their particular predilections. Brest, supra note 14, at 1089. Of elaborate efforts to construct
such a theory, Sanford Levinson, a dedicated activist, wrote, "[i]t is naive to pretend that the construction will be an easy
task or that we can so easily shed the view of the Constitution, and its limits, articulated by Berger." Levinson, Book
Review, 236 NATION 250 (1983). See also infra note 40.
22. Sager, supra note 1, at 21 n.10.
23. Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 COLUNM. L REv. 1001, 1005 (1965).
24. Id. Michael Perry considers that "congressional power over the jurisdiction of the federal judiciary, including
the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, is not disputed." Perry, Noninterpretive Review in Human Rights Cases:
A Functional Justification, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 278, 332 (1981). Louis Lusky refers to Congress' "undoubted authority to
strip away virtually all power of the federal courts to engage in judicial review." Lusky, Book Review, 6 HAsTINOS
CoNST. L.Q. 403, 412 (1979). Sanford Levinson is "inclined to accept the view that Congress indeed has power, subject
to extremely few constraints, to determine federal jurisdiction however it sees fit." Levinson, The Turn Toward
Functionalism in Constitutional Theory, 8 U. DAYTON L. REv. 567, 575 (1983). To my mind the cases abundantly justify
such views, as will appear.
25. Black, The Presidency and Congress, 32 WASH. & LEEL. REv. 841, 847 (1975). Scharpf likewise insists "that
judicial review in a democracy remains defensible only to the extent that the Court itself will be defenseless against the
processes through which the community may assert and enforce its own considered understanding of its basic code."
Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517, 589 (1966).
26. See M. PEsRRY, supra note 13, at 138.
27. THE FEDE.ALisT No. 81 (A. Hamilton).
28. Id. at 523-24 (Mod. Libr. ed. 1937).
29. Id. at 526-27.
30. 1 J. BRYCE, THE AMEmCAN CommoNwExLm 212 (new ed. 1914) (discussing relations between Congress and
the President).
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Congressional control of the courts' jurisdiction under article III has the sanction
of the First Congress, draftsmen of the Judiciary Act of 1789,31 and of an unbroken
string of decisions stretching from the beginning of the Republic. 32 Such control of
the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction derives from the article III provision that it
shall be subject to "such exceptions and under such regulations as the Congress shall
make." William Van Alstyne considers that "[t]he power to make exceptions to
Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction is a plenary power. It is given in express terms
and without limitation." 33 Sager himself observes that "[i]t seems odd-indeed
inappropriate-to find in as barren an expression as 'with such Exceptions. . .as the
Congress shall make' the existence of some category of jurisdiction beyond Con-
gress' reach." 3 4 For activists, according to John Hart Ely, "the most important
datum bearing on what was intended is the constitutional language itself," 35 adding
that "the only reliable evidence of what 'the ratifiers' thought they were ratifying is
obviously the language of the provisions they approved.' 36 It is therefore refreshing
to find Sager so frequently turning to the legislative history, 37 for in their efforts to
undergird the desegregation, reapportionment and Bill of Rights decisions, activists
have consigned legislative history to the outermost bounds of limbo. 38 Let Paul Brest
speak:
[M]any scholars and judges reject Berger's major premise, that constitutional interpreta-
tion should depend chiefly on the intent of those who framed and adopted such a provi-
sion .... [W]hatever the framers' expectations may have been, broad constitutional
guarantees require the Court to discern, articulate and apply values that are widely and
deeply held by our society. 39
31. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73. Charles Warren considered that the First Congress was "almost an
adjourned session" of the Constitutional Convention. C. WARREN, CONGRESS, THE CoNsrrurtoN AND THE SUPRE.tE
COURT 99 (1925). Sager notes that 19 Framers, including Oliver Ellsworth, Elbridge Gerry, James Madison, William
Paterson and Roger Sherman, were members of the First Congress. Sager, supra note I, at 31 n.37. To these may be
added many who had, participated in the state ratification conventions.
32. See, e.g., Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 567-68 (1962); Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506
(1869); Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236 (1845); Wiscart v. Dauchy, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 321 (1796). See infra text
accompanying notes 74-93.
33. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Ex Parte McCardle, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 229, 260 (1973).
34. Sager, supra note 1, at 45.
35. Ely, Constitutional Interpretivism: Its Allure and Impossibility, 53 IND. L.J. 399, 418 (1978) (emphasis in
original).
36. Id. at 419.
37. But he notes the argument that "[t]he broad license that article Ill gives Congress to limit the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court ... is beyond restraints spun from threads as slender as perceptions about intent of the framers." Sager,
supra note 1, at 44. He tells us that the
"exceptions and regulations" language.., was adopted by the Convention ... without a ripple of recorded
debate, concern, or explication. In light of this quiescence, it is hard to imagine that the framers were
consciously adopting a provision that could completely unravel one of the most basic aspects of the con-
stitutional scheme to which they had committed themselves.
Id. at 51 (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 42. This is an extraordinary interpretive approach: silence authorizes the
curtailment of an express, unmistakable text! The First Congress (see supra note 24) speedily embodied in the Judiciary
Act of 1789 the very unravelling provision-on a grand scale-that Sager condemns: federal question jurisdiction was
made the exclusive province of the state courts subject to limited review by the Supreme Court. And even more "basic"
was the mandate that every branch comply with constitutional limits. R. BERGER, DEATH PENALTIES, supra note 10. at
-77-79; see infra text accompanying notes 282-87.
38. See, e.g., Brest, The Misconceived Questfor the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REv. 204 (1980); Alfange,
Book Review, 5 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 603, 608-15, (1978).
39. Brest, Book Review, N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1977, § 7 (Book Rev.), at 44. For comment on "values that are
widely and deeply held," see infra text accompanying notes 218-42.
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Activists cannot have it both ways; resort to legislative history must be evenhanded.
Were effect given to the history of the fourteenth amendment, the motivation for
"court-stripping" would disappear. The history of the fourteenth amendment, more
and more activists agree, shows that jurisdiction over suffrage and segregation was
withheld and the Bill of Rights was not incorporated therein, 40 thereby undermining
the Court's desegregation, reapportionment, school prayer and like decisions-areas
Sager would shield from "stripping."
4 1
Against this background, Sager's repeated emphasis on the Court's duty to
safeguard "constitutional rights" 42 begs the question. "Constitutional rights" are
those created by the Constitution, not those pulled out of thin air by the Court without
constitutional warrant.43 Increasingly, activists agree that most modem "rights" are
not specified in the Constitution, but have been fashioned by the Court.' Perry
40. An activist, Nathaniel Nathanson, wrote about my conclusion that segregation and suffrage were excluded by the
framers from the fourteenth amendment: "These are not surprising historical conclusions. The first was quite conclusively
demonstrated by Alexander Bickel ... ; the second was also quite convincingly demonstrated by ... Mr. Justice
Harlan .... Mr. Berger's independent research and analysis confirms and adds weight to those conclusions." Nathan-
son, Book Review, 56 TEx. L. REv. 579, 581 (1978). Perry observed, "The framers of the fourteenth amendment did not
intend to ban state-ordered racial segregation, and yet the Supreme Court has done so." M. PERRY, supra note 13, at 92.
For additional citations see Perry, Interpretivism. Freedom of Expression, and Equal Protection, 42 OHIo ST. L.J. 261,
285 n.100 (1981), who adds that my finding that the fourteenth amendment was not intended to make the Bill of Rights
applicable to the States "is amply documented and widely accepted." Id. at 286.
41. See Sager, supra note 1, at 17-18, 88-89.
42. Id. at 68, 70, 72, 77, 79.
43. In his classic post-Civil War commentary on the Constitution, Chief Justice Thomas Cooley stated that a court
cannot "declare a statute unconstitutional and void, solely on the ground of unjust and oppressive provisions, or because it
is supposed to violate the natural, social, or political rights of the citizen, unless it can be shown that such injustice is
prohibited or such rights guaranteed or protected by the Constitution." T. COOLEY, A TREATIsE ON THE CONSTITUrIONAL
LtMrrATONs 341 (8th ed. 1927). Similar sentiments were uttered by the Framers in rejecting the Council of Revision. R.
BERGER, GovERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORNIMTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 301 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as R. BERGER, GovERtEN-r BY JUDICIARY]. For Chief Justice Warren's flagrant disregard of such canons, see infra
text accompanying notes 218-42.
44. Perry observes that since "there is neither a textual nor a historiqal justification ... for noninterpretive review
in human rights cases, [unless there is a functional justification] virtually all of constitutional doctrine regarding human
rights fashioned by the Supreme Court in this century must be judged illegitimate." M. PERRY, supra note 13, at 91. It
"becomes virtually impossible to justify the Court's actions [in providing 'vigorous protection for constitutional rights of
minorities'] on the ground that it is doing no more than 'finding' the law of the Constitution and fulfilling the intention of
its framers." J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 137 (1980). Terrance Sandalow
emphasizes the difference between "two quite different problems"-() "the protection of individual and minority
rights," and (2) "the definition of the rights that individuals and minorities should have." He questioned "what mandate
courts can claim for exercising powers to determine what the rights of individuals and minorities should be, especially
since decisions regarding those rights will have an important impact upon the interests of others." Sandalow, The Distrust
of Politics, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rv. 446, 460 (1981) (emphasis added). Gary C. Leedes considers that "It]he framers did not
intend article III to empower a federal judge to invalidate legislation simply because he decides that, beyond its limita-
tions, the Constitution should protect a claimant's rights." Leedes, The Supreme Court Mess, 57 Tax. L. REv. 1361,
1385 (1979). See also Berger, Paul Brest's Brief for an Imperial Judiciary, 40 MD. L. Rv. 1, 18-22 (1981). Perry
considers that a person's claim that his "human rights" have been violated is "really a claim about what human rights he
ought to be deemed to have ... when no value judgment constitutionalized by the framers is determinative." M. PERRY,
supra note 13, at 112 (emphasis added). Sager aflrms that "[a]bsent a cognizable body of rights, the justification for
judicial review is all but conclusively dissipated." Sager, Rights Skepticism and Process-Based Responses, 56 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 417, 420 (1981) (footnotes omitted). Gary C. Leedes also considers that there are "no extra-constitutional minority
rights." Leedes, Supra, at 1385.
When Ira Lupu writes that "Perry's noninterpretivism removes most modem constitutional protection of the in-
dividual from the written Constitution," he assumes that "modem" individual rights were in the written Constitution,
when as activists now acknowledge, they are extraconstitutional constructs without roots in the "written Constitution."
Lupu, Constitutional Theory and the Search for the Workable Premise, 8 U. DAYTON L. REv. 579, 608 (1983). A recent
acknowledgement of the fact is that of Larry Alexander "There is no power delegated to Congress under article I or the
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understands Sager to doubt "that very much modem constitutional doctrine regarding
human rights can be grounded in the written Constitution." 45 For present purposes it
may be assumed that congressional control of jurisdiction does not extend to "rights"
specified in the Constitution. 46 The issue, rather, is whether such control may be
exercised to curb judicial arrogation of power that proceeds in despite of the Constitu-
tion. In Federalist No. 83 Hamilton wrote that the judicial authority extended to
"certain cases particularly specified. The expression of those cases marks theprecise
limits, beyond which the federal courts cannot extend their jurisdiction." 47 Con-
sequently, the specification of cases "arising under this Constitution" excludes cases
not "arising" thereunder but drawn from external sources.4 8 And if, as Hamilton
stated, Congress was confined to laws passed "in pursuance of their just and con-
stitutional powers of legislation," 49 the Court equally was bound to stay within its
"just and constitutional powers" of adjudication.5
Sager stresses "the firm commitment to federal supervision of the states re-
flected in the history and logic of the Constitution."- 51 But that is only half of the
story. The states' rights advocates at the Constitutional Convention, as Sager notes,
"were most concerned with bridling the federal government" and "least supportive
of a substantial judiciary.", 52 Their unrelenting pressure left a deep imprint on the
structure and powers of that judiciary. Because many, like William Grayson of
Virginia, felt that state courts were "the principal defence of the states,"-53 their
stubborn insistence on state court arbitrament of federal-state conflicts persisted and
soon was expressed in the Judiciary Act of 1789. 54 The supremacy clause, Hamilton
enforcement provisions of the Civil War Amendments to enact legislation enforcing values not constitutionalized."
Alexander, Painting Without Numbers: Noninterpreive Judicial Review, 8 U. DAYTON L. REV. 447, 458 (1983).
Centuries ago Dante noted that the "usurpation of a right does not create a right." W. DURATrr, THE AoE or FArT
1063 (1950).
45. M. PERty, supra note 13, at x n.* (emphasis in original). Notwithstanding, Sager refers only to "highly
controversial federal court decisions recognizing individual rights." Sager, supra note 1, at 68.
46. For the factors implicated in that assumption, see Berger, Michael Perry's Functional Justificationfor Judicial
Activism, 8 U. DAYTON L. REV. 466, 511-12 (1983).
47. Tue FEDERALIST No. 83, at 541 (A. Hamilton) (Mod. Libr. ed. 1937) (emphasis added).
48. "[A]rticle III grants the federal courts power to decide cases 'arising under the Constitution,' but it does not
grant the power to decide cases involving extra-constitutional value judgments." Alexander, Painting Without the
Numbers: Noninterpretive Judicial Review, 8 U. DAYTON L. REV. 447, 458 (1983).
49. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 515 (A. Hamilton) (Mod. Libr. ed. 1937).
50. The Founders were more attached to the legislatures than to the courts. Of the three branches, Hamilton assured
the ratifiers, the judiciary is next to nothing. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 504 n.* (A. Hamilton) (Mod. Libr. ed. 1937)
(quoting MoNTEsQuIEU, THE SPIrr OF LAws). In his 1791 lectures, Justice James Wilson admonished America that it
was time "to chastise our prejudices" (i.e., courts had been "objects of aversion and distrust"). I THE WORKS OF JAMES
WILSON 292-93 (R. McCloskey ed. 1967).
51. Sager, supra note 1, at 45.
52. Id. at 58. For discussion of the Founders' passionate attachment to state sovereignty, see R. BEGER, CONGREsS
V. TIE SUPREME COURT 261-63 (1969) [hereinafter cited as R. BERGER, CONGRESS].
53. 3 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITImON 563 (J.
Elliott ed. 1827-30 & photo. reprint 1941). In the North Carolina Convention Spencer declared, "[T]he state gov-
ernments are the basis of our happiness security and prosperity." A. MASON, THE STATES RIorS DEBATE: ANTI-
FEDERALISM AND THE CONSTITUTION 161 (2d ed. 1972). Contrast with Grayson's observations Sager's remark that all
congressional control can accomplish is to "take Congress out of the grip of the federal courts and put it in the grip of state
judiciaries." Sager, supra note 1, at 41. That choice was made by the First Congress and it remains for Congress to make
it. So far as Congress invades the sovereignty over local matters reserved to the states, the Framers made the state courts
the first resort.
54. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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wrote in Federalist No. 33, "expressly confines this supremacy to laws made pur-
suant to the Constitution;"5 5 federal acts which are not pursuant thereto but "are
invasions of the residuary powers of the smaller societies ... will be merely acts of
usurpation and will deserve to be treated as such.'"56 His condemnation of usurpation
extended to judicial arrogation.57 Madison assured the ratifiers in Federalist No. 39
that federal jurisdiction "extends to certain enumerated objects only, and leaves to
the several States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other objects." 58 He
particularized in Federalist No. 45 that federal powers "will be exercised principally
on external objects, as war, peace, negotiation and foreign commerce . . . .The
powers reserved to the several States will extend to all the objects which ... con-
cer ... the internal order.., of the State. ' , 59 To Madison and Hamilton, Garry
55. THE FEDRmALIST No. 33, at 202 (A. Hamilton) (Mod. Libr. ed. 1937) (emphasis in original).
56. Id. (emphasis added); R. BExost, CONGRESS, supra note 52, at 13-16, 266-67. The Constitution's restrictions
on federal jurisdiction are discussed infra, text accompanying notes 279-97. Against this Sager argues,
It is hard to imagine that total congressional control f Supreme Court jurisdiction was deliberately embraced by
the same body that had worried for months about restraint of the states, had fought to a compromise over the
structure of Congress, and had engaged in a tug-of-war over congressional control ofjudicial appointment until
the final hour of its deliberations.
Sager, supra note 1, at 52 (footnotes omitted). The great "compromise," which assured the states equal representation in
the Senate, responded to the states rights proponents' fears that "[proportional representation would strike 'at the
existence of the lesser States."' A. MASON, supra note 53, at 37. A states' rights leader, William Paterson, "virtually
equated state sovereignty with equal state representation." Id. at 40. Alpheus Thomas Mason concluded that "[e]nemies
of a strong national government, as well as friends of the small states, had good reason to hail the Connecticut
Compromise as a victory. The term 'compromise' is a misnomer." Id. at 49. Another victory was scored when the final
compromise left creation of inferior courts in the discretion of Congress, and the First Congress then left federal
jurisdiction exclusively with the state courts with spotty appeals to the Supreme Court. The nationalists "were convinced
that they had suffered fatal defeats." Id. at 58.
57. See THE FEo.DtALSr No. 33, at 201-02 (A. Hamilton) (Mod. Libr. ed. 1937). Sager observes that the
jurisdiction of the Court "was consciously tailored to the role of supervising the enforcement of the supremacy clause,"
Sager, supra note 1, at 51, but fails to note that it did not extend to invasions of the residuary powers of the states. Justice
James Iredell stated, "The question then under this [supremacy] clause, will always be whether congress has exceeded its
authority. If it has not exceeded it we must obey, otherwise not." A. MASON, supra note 53, at 165. And he said, "If
Congress, under pretence of exercising the power delegated to them, should in fact, by the exercise of any other power,
usurp upon the rights of the different [State] Legislatures .... [i]t would be an act of tyranny." Id. at 128.
58. THE FEDERALisT No. 39, at 249 (J. Madison) (Mod. Libr. ed. 1937) (emphasis added). See also comments of A.
Hamilton, infra text accompanying notes 157-58.
59. THE FEDERAISr No. 45, at 303 (J. Madison) (Mod. Libr. ed. 1937) (emphasis added). Madison proposed
"complete authority in all cases where uniform measures are necessary." A. MASON, supra note 53, at 62. Wilson
likewise emphasized that federal power extends to matters "to the direction of which no state is competent," id. at 15,
which "extend beyond the bounds of the particular States," id. at 76, therefore not embracing, for example, local control
of education or criminal law enforcement. Iredell assured the North Carolina Ratification Convention that "[w]ith the
mere internal concerns of a State, Congress are to have nothing to do." Id. at 127. Chief Justice Marshall, who in the
Virginia Ratification Convention had vigorously defended judicial review to curb action in excess of constitutional
bounds, stated in Gibbons v. Ogden that the federal powers applied
to all the external concerns of the nation, and to those internal concerns which affect the States generally; but not
to those which are completely within a particular State, which do not affect other States, and with which it is not
necessary to interfere, for the purpose of executing some of the general powers of the government.
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824).
Contrast this with Sager's view that
[flederal judicial supervision of state conduct is particularly important because of the daily impact of state and
local government on the lives of individuals .... States or their municipal constituents register voters, run
public schools, control access to speech opportunities, employ the police personnel with whom citizens regu-
larly have contact, regulate the use of land, license professionals, and regulate families.
Sager, supra note 1, at 55 n. 112. In short, Sager would have Big Brother take over administration of local matters which
Madison assured the Framers were left to the states, to be forever "inviolable." See THE FDsRsAusr No. 39, at 249 (Q.
Madison) (Mod. Libr. ed. 1937). This is the mainspring of Sager's attack on congressional curtailment of jurisdiction to
continue on this path.
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Wills observes, "it seemed inconceivable ... that a central authority would want to
descend to the enforcement of local laws. "60 Their assurances to the ratifiers were
calculated to allay intense fears that the federal government would invade or swallow
up the sovereignty of the States. 61
The basic issue, therefore, is whether the people may protect themselves from a
judicial takeover of local government that was reserved to the states. Instead of
meeting that issue, Sager asserts that "if Congress were able to free the States from
federal judicial supervision, the constitutional order would be badly wrenched," '6 2
when in truth it has been "badly wrenched" by the Court's arrogation of jurisdiction
withheld. One can agree that "the framers put critical restraints on state autonomy
into the Constitution itself" 63 and yet reject the non sequitur that states are equally
bound by restraints imported by the Court that the Framers did not put into the
Constitution. The federal courts, Hamilton stated, were to overrule state laws that
"might be in manifest contravention of the articles of Union"; 64 that was the scope of
the "firm commitment" to federal supervision of state courts relied on by Sager. 65 It
is not breached when Congress intervenes to deprive the Court of jurisdiction to enter
decisions that manifestly deprive states of rights reserved to them by the Constitution.
Current assaults on the long-recognized congressional power are without histor-
ical or judicial warrant; they are simply, as activist Michael Perry wrote, "attacks, by
those enthusiastic about the modem Court's activist work product."66 Such academi-
cians, having cheered on the Court in the realization of their social aspirations, now
seek to barricade the way to correction of the Court's excesses.
II. THE CASES
Sager's discussion of the cases is replete with remarkable readings of what they
held. He finds "ambiguous statements in early decisions," 67 but concludes that
"article III itself contains a direct, self-executing grant of jurisdiction" to the
Court, 68 a matter "well established" 69 when Chief Justice Taney wrote for the Court
60. G. WILLS, Introduction to THE FEDERALIST at xiv (1982). Oliver Ellsworth stated in the Convention, "The
Nat[iona]l Gov[emmen]t could not descend to the local objects on which this [individual rights] depended. It could only
embrace objects of a general nature. He turned his eyes therefore for the preservation of his rights to the State Gov-
[emmen]ts." I THE RECORDS OFTHE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 492 (M. Farand ed. 1911). "In the Convention
and later, states rights-not individual rights-was the real worry." A. MASON, supra note 53, at 78.
61. R. BERGER, CONGRESS, supra note 52, at 261-62.
62. Sager, supra note 1, at 45. He insists that to conclude that "Congress can sweep aside the entire federal judicial
establishment in order to facilitate state court repudiation of Supreme Court doctrine ... seems at war with our commit-
ment to national constitutional government." Id. at 74. That commitment was to limited national government, to state
sovereignty over local matters; it did not contemplate shelter for lawless judicial infringements of that sovereignty.
Justices as diverse as Chief Justice Burger and Justices Douglas and Frankfurter insist on looking at the Constitution for
themselves, never mind what their predecessors said about it. See R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note
43, at 297 & n.57. The right of the sovereign people is no more limited.
63. Sager, supra note 1, at 46.
64. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 516 (A. Hamilton) (Mod. Libr. ed. 1937) (emphasis added).
65. See Sager, supra note 1, at 45-57.
66. M. PERRY, supra note 13, at 138.
67. Sager, supra note 1, at 23.
68. Id. at 23-24.
69. Id. at 24 n.16.
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in Barry v. Mercein.70 Taney apparently was unaware that it was "well established,"
for he held that "[b]y the constitution ... the Supreme Court possesses no appellate
power in any case, unless conferred upon it by act of Congress.", 7 1 Congress,
moreover, Sager notes, "has never chosen to act as though the Supreme Court's
jurisdiction were self-executing. From the Judiciary Act of 1789 on, Congress has
assumed the statutory voice of affirmatively granting the Court jurisdiction. 7 2
Regarding Congress' power "to subtract legal issues" from the Court's jurisdiction,
he observes that "[t]he Court itself has shared this understanding. In no opinion has
the Court taken a contrary view. Indeed .... the Court displays an almost unseemly
enthusiasm in discussing Congress' power to lop off diverse heads of the Court's
article III jurisdiction." 73 Thus, in defending the Court against "stripping," Sager is
more royalist than the king.
Among the allegedly "ambiguous statements" Sager finds is that of Wiscart v.
Dauchy,74 in which Chief Justice Ellsworth held that, "[ijf Congress has provided no
rule to regulate our proceedings, we cannot exercise an appellate jurisdiction" 75 -a
tolerably unambiguous statement that in the absence of congressional action the Court
has no appellate jurisdiction. Ellsworth had been a draftsman of the exceptions clause
as a member of the Committee on Detail, and of the Judiciary Act of 178976 in the
First Congress, and therefore was presumably familiar with the Framers' intentions as
well as those of the First Congress. His statement is to be read against that back-
ground. Sager notes that in the Judiciary Act, after excluding federal question juris-
diction from the purview of the inferior courts-an exclusion that survived until
1875--a Congress familiar with the drafting of article III withheld from the Court
large portions of section 2 jurisdiction. This was no oversight, to be corrected in
short order, but the forging of an enduring pattern," 77 so that some exclusions
remained for 125 years or more.78
70. 46 U.S. (5 How.) 103 (1847).
71. Id. at 119 (emphasis added).
The pivotal language . . . -- to the effect that the Court possesses no jurisdiction unless Congress has conferred
it-is ambiguous; it may do no more than restate the practical result of the rule of Durousseau v. United States,
10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 307 (1810);... that purportedly positive grants of jurisdiction by Congress are to be read
to exclude the jurisdiction not granted.
Sager, supra note 1, at 23 n. 16. What is ambiguous about restating that in the absence of a positive grant there is no
jurisdiction? The unequivocal terms of the exceptions clause speak for themselves.
72. Sager, supra note I, at 24-25 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
73. Id. at 32 (footnotes omitted). In J. W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1927), the
unanimous Court declared, "This Court has repeatedly laid down the principle that a contemporaneous legislative
exposition of the Constitution when the founders of our Government and framers of our Constitution were actively
participating in public affairs, long acquiesced in, fixes the construction to be given its provisions." Id. at 412 (citations
omitted).
74. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 321 (1796).
75. Id. at 327.
76. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
77. Sager, supra note 1, at 31 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). The First Congress' withholding was confirmed
by the Court: "[W]hole classes of cases [may] be kept out of the jurisdiction altogether." The "Francis Wright," 105
U.S. 381, 386 (1882). The "Francis Wright" is cited by Sager for the proposition that article III "contains a direct,
self-executing grant of jurisdiction." Sager, supra note 1, at 24 & n.17.
78. Sager observes that "[t]he First Judiciary Act was not especially generous to the Court, and for a number of
years there remained some rather surprising gaps in the Court's jurisdiction." Sager, supra note 1, at 52-53. For example,
the "Court was not granted general power to review major federal criminal cases until 1891." Id. at 53 n. 105. Compare
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Little wonder that Cary v. Curtis79 declared, "[T]he judicial power of the
United States, although it has its origin in the Constitution, is . . .dependent for its
distribution... entirely upon the action of Congress." 80 Daniels v. Railroad Co.s '
repeated, "[I]t is for Congress to determine how far. . . appellate jurisdiction shall
be given, and when conferred .... it is wholly the creature of legislation." 82 And in
1892, after Congress had granted it jurisdiction in criminal cases, the Court held,
"The appellate jurisdiction of this court rests wholly on the acts of Congress.", 83
Even Chief Justice Warren, that paragon of activist judges, stated, "It is axiomatic,
as a matter of history as well as doctrine, that the existence of appellate jurisdiction in
a specific federal court over a given type of case is dependent upon authority ex-
pressly conferred by statute.' '84
All this is burlesqued by Sager: "Congress acts as though it were giving the
Court jurisdiction in measured statutory doses, and ordinarily the Court has no occa-
sion to take umbrage at this pretense.'"85 And he states that "[tihe judiciary has never
had the occasion to rule decisively on such incursions into federal jurisdiction.'86 Ex
parte McCardle87 is to the contrary. Henry Hart, no friend of "court-stripping,"
wrote of McCardle,
[I]n perhaps the most spectacular of historic examples a unanimous Court recognized the
power of Congress to frustrate a determination of the constitutionality of the post-Civil
War reconstruction legislation by withdrawing, during the very pendency of an appeal, its
jurisdiction to review decisions of the federal circuit courts in habeas corpus.88
McCardle, Sager comments, "endorse[d] the broad power of Congress to tamper
with [the Court's] jurisdiction." 8 9 But he speculates that McCardle might be decided
differently today; among other things, "the Court did not address itself to issues of
equal protection and due process-which is not surprising in view of the fact that the
fourteenth amendment had not yet been passed. 90 But the due process clause of the
fifth amendment was available because a federal act was involved, although the
distorted version of due process that characterized the laissez-faire Court was yet
unborn. Without pausing to consider such possibilities, the Court approved McCardle
with this Sager's assertion that "[aln 'exception' implies a minor deviation from a surviving norm; it is a nibble, not a
bite. And there is reason to believe that this sense of the term was, if anything, clearer at the time the Constitution was
drafted than now"! Id. at 44.
79. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236 (1845).
80. Id. at 245.
81. 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 250 (1866).
82. Id. at 254 (emphasis added).
83. United States v. Sanger, 144 U.S. 310, 319 (1892) (emphasis added).
84. Carroll v. United States, 354 U.S. 394, 399 (1957) (emphasis added).
85. Sager, supra note 1, at 25 (emphasis added).
86. Id. at 19.
87. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869).
88. Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARv. L.
REv. 1362, 1362-63 (1953). In Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), Justices Brennan, White and Marshall stated,
"Radical disenchantment with decisions of this Court had led ... to the Act of March 27, 1868 .... withdrawing our
appellate jurisdiction over certain habeas corpus cases. See Ex pane McCardle ..... Id. at 275 n.43 (citation omitted)
(Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
89. Sager, supra note 1, at 54 (emphasis added).
90. Id. at 77 n.187.
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in Glidden Co. v. Zdanok.9' And the continuing vitality of McCardle was recognized
by no less an activist than Justice Douglas: "As respects our appellate jurisdiction,
Congress may largely fashion it as Congress desires by reason of the express pro-
visions of § 2, Art. I. See Ex parte McCardle .... 92 Justice Frankfurter, a
pioneer student of federal jurisdiction, stated, "Congress need not give this Court any
appellate power; it may withdraw appellate jurisdiction once conferred and it may do
so even while a case is sub judice. Ex parte McCardle."93 So far as the cases go,
therefore, Sager patently has a hard row to hoe.
He is not helped by United States v. Klein94 to which he repeatedly turns:95
"When Congress manipulates jurisdiction in an effort to deny recognition and ju-
dicial enforcement of constitutional rights, it has deliberately set itself against the
Constitution as the Court understands that document .... Klein stands for nothing
less." 96 The Klein decision merely rejected a congressional attempt "to prescribe a
rule for the decision of a cause in a particular way," explaining that "this is not an
exercise of the acknowledged power of Congress to make exceptions and prescribe
regulations to the appellate power." 97 Much later, Glidden Co. v. Zdanok98 stated
that in Klein "the claimant had already been adjudged entitled to recover by the Court
of Claims"; hence application of the statute was rejected as "an unconstitutional
attempt to invade the judicial province by prescribing a rule of decision in a pending
case," 99 and therefore distinguishable from McCardle, wherein the Court was de-
prived of jurisdiction. Sager's failure to perceive the difference between the two is of
a piece with his insistence that since Congress cannot reverse a particular decision, it
cannot withdraw the Court's jurisdiction to decide.'1 ° But as Michael Perry points
out, article I "gives Congress the jurisdiction-limiting power, but not the power
legislatively to reverse." 10 ' That distinction was drawn by Hamilton in Federalist
No. 81: although a "legislature... cannot reverse a determination once made in a
particular case," 102 "usurpations [by] the Supreme Court ... will [not] be un-
controllable and remediless." 10 3 In the very same No. 81 Hamilton declared that the
Court's appellate jurisdiction will be "subject to any exceptions and regulations
91. 370 U.S. 530, 567-68 (1962).
92. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 109 (1968) (citation omitted).
93. National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 655 (1949) (citation omitted) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting on othergrounds). Louis Lusky refers to Congress' "undoubted authority to strip away virtually all power of
the federal courts to engage in judicial review." Lusky, Book Review, 6 HASTINGS CoNsr. L.Q. 403, 412 (1979)
(footnotes omitted).
94. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872).
95. Sager, supra note 1, at 70, 71, 72, 73, 76-77.
96. Id. at 76-77. Among Sager's citations is Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), an excellent example of
how "the Court understands" the Constitution. There the Court found that the "right to travel," as to whose provenance
no two Justices agreed, entitled an indigent migrant to immediate support at the terminus! See Berger, Residence
Requirements for Welfare and Voting: A Post-Mortem, 42 OHIo ST. L.J. 853 (1981); see also supra note 10.
97. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146 (1872).
98. 370 U.S. 530 (1962).
99. Id. at 568.
100. For a discussion of his statement to that effect see infra text accompanying notes 106-07.
101. M. PERRY, supra note 11, at 135.
102. THE FEDEa.usr No. 81, at 526 (A. Hamilton) (Mod. Libr. ed. 1937).
103. Id. at 523.
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which may be thought advisable, "'04 thus distinguishing the power to reverse from
the powe' to control jurisdiction. Sager's failure to perceive this distinction leads him
to say that "there is no indication that the framers saw Congress' power over jurisdic-
tion as a way to manipulate federal jurisdiction." 1 °5 Time and again he insists that
"Congress cannot use jurisdiction to undermine the decisions of the Supreme
Court,"' 6 that it cannot "undo the Supreme Court's constitutional doctrine by
simple legislative fiat, and it should not be able to accomplish the same end by
manipulating federal jurisdiction." 10 7 But impeachment for judicial usurpation might
equally be labelled manipulation of federal doctrine, yet the ratifiers were assured by
Hamilton that impeachment would furnish the cure;"0 ' article III merely furnishes an
alternate remedy.
I1. SAGER'S LIMITATION ARGUMENTS
Sager observes that "while Congress does enjoy great discretion in molding
federal jurisdiction, serious restrictions nevertheless limit congressional authority to
enact" the current jurisdiction withdrawal bills. "9 In undertaking to limit jurisdiction
Congress, he asserts, "is fully bound by the constitutional limitations that ordinarily
constrain its behavior."' 1 0 But he notices that "from Supreme Court dicta and
academic commentary there occasionally emerges a sense that Congress is immune
from full constitutional scrutiny when the distribution of jurisdiction is at stake."'
The burden is on Sager to demonstrate that the plenary, unequivocal terms of the
exceptions clause mean less than they say. In McCardle, he tells us, "[t]he Court
implicitly followed Chief Justice Marshall's view that these enumerated powers
should be construed broadly." ' 1 2 Early on, Justice James Wilson's view in dissent
that "a positive restriction" by Congress would have to yield to the "superior
authority""' 3 of the Constitution was rejected by the Court in Wiscart v. Dauchy."4
Sager's bill of particulars fails to make out his case.
104. Id. at 533 (emphasis in original).
105. Sager, supra note 1, at 42 n.71.
106. Id. at 38. "One starts with the observation that Congress cannot override the constitutional decisions of the
Supreme Court by a simple legislative act." Id. at 39. He notes without differentiating that "[a] proposal that the 'judicial
power shall be exercised in such manner as the Legislature shall direct' was repulsed." Id. at 49 (quoting 2 THE RECORDS
OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 425, 431 (M. Farrand ed. 1911) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
107. Id. at 68 (footnotes omitted).
108. See infra text accompanying note 158.
109. Sager, supra note 1, at 21-22.
110. Id. at 37.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 77 n.187.
113. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 321, 325 (1796) (Wilson, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 327. See supra text accompanying notes 74-75. As an example of "patently unconstitutional limitation"
on federal court jurisdiction of federal questions under existing statutes, Sager instances "a provision restricting jurisdic-
tion to plaintiffs of a particular ... religion." Sager, supra note 1, at 26. Federal jurisdiction over religion was first
claimed by the Court in the mid-twentieth century, resting on the alleged incorporation of the Bill of Rights in the
fourteenth amendment, which activists increasingly agree is historically untenable. See, e.g., Brest, The Misconceived
Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. Rev. 204 (1980); Alfange, Book Review, 5 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
603 (1978); for citations see Perry, Interpretivism, Freedom of Expression, and Equal Protection, 42 OHIo ST. L.J. 261,
285-86 (1981). As late as 1922 the Court held that the first amendment does not apply to the states. Prudential Ins. Co. of
Am. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530, 538 (1922). The Court's subsequent decisions to the contrary do not settle the issue when




Sager argues that "[a]rticle III does not say 'Congress shall withhold such
jurisdiction as it may deem appropriate.'- 115 That hardly squares with his view that
"Congress does enjoy great discretion." 116 Moreover, such exceptions "as Congress
shall make" patently leaves the judgment of what is appropriate to Congress. Hamil-
ton said in Federalist No. 81 that the exceptions clause "will enable the government
to modify [appellate jurisdiction] in such a manner as will best answer the ends of
public justice and security" 7 -a judgment necessarily left in the discretion of
Congress, who could make "any exceptions and regulations which may be thought
advisable."'18 A vigorous advocate of adoption of the Constitution, Justice James
Iredell, declared that given a grant of power to the legislature, action within the grant
"only exercise[s] a discretion expressly confided to them by the constitution." '1 19 A
grant of power carries with it discretion how to exercise it. So the Supreme Court held
in the present context in Daniels v. Railroad Co. 20 that "it is for Congress to
determine how far... appellate jurisdiction shall be given.', 121 When Sager appeals
to a Committee report for the proposition that "such open discretion was rejected by
the framers,"' 122  he overlooks that the proposal- 'the judicial power shall be
exercised in such manner as the Legislature shall direct'" 2 3  sought congressional
control of how a court shall decide as distinguished from curtailment of its jurisdic-
tion to decide, a power exercised and accepted from the beginning.
Congressional discretion is attacked by Sager from another angle under the
heading "The Vice of Selective Deprivation of Jurisdiction": current bills, he urges,
"deprive federal courts of jurisdiction in a highly selective way.' ' 124 What could be
more selective than the Norris-LaGuardia Act's withdrawal of federal jurisdiction to
issue injunctions in labor disputes? 25 Yet the Act was sustained by the Court. 126 So
too, as Sager notes, the 1789 Judiciary Act left "surprising gaps in the Court's
jurisdiction."' 2 7 In contrast with his strident charge that control advocates are en-
gaged in "tawdry... sabotag[e of] the integrity of the judicial process' ' 128 he
115. Sager, supra note 1, at 44.
116. Id. at 21.
117. THE FEDERAtISr No. 81, at 532-33 (A. Hamilton) (Mod. Libr. ed. 1937).
118. Id. at 533 (emphasis added).
119. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 266 (1796). Control of executive discretion also lies beyond the judicial
function. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 169-70 (1803); Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497, 515
(1840).
120. 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 250 (1866).
121. Id. at 254. Justice Stone declared many years later that "[w]hen the action ofa legislature is within the scope of
its power. fairly debatable questions as to its reasonableness, wisdom and propriety are not for the determination of courts,
but for the legislative body." South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Bamwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 190-91 (1938).
122. Sager, supra note 1, at 44 (footnote omitted). See also id. at 50.
123. Id. at 50 n.95 (emphasis added) (quoting 2 THE REcORDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVESNTON OF 1787, at 425, 431
(M. Fanrand ed. 1911)); see supra text accompanying notes 94-108.
124. Sager, supra note 1, at 68.
125. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101, 115 (1976).
126. Lauf v. E.G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323, 329-30 (1938).
127. Sager, supra note 1, at 53.
128. Id. at 89. An example of Sager's loaded rhetoric: "If ... Congress removes slices of federal jurisdiction in
order to insulate federal conduct from disfavored constitutional challenges," it "will be insulating its own un-
constitutional conduct .... ." Id. at 69. Consider this against the Court's invalidation of the Child Labor Law in Hammer
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understates the congressional concern, shared by more and more activists, that has
been "provoked by highly controversial federal court decisions recognizing in-
dividual rights." 1 29 Despite the "highly controversial" character of these decisions,
Sager dwells on "the vice of selectively depriving the federal courts of jurisdiction
over discrete and disfavored claims of constitutional right." 130 But rights drawn by
the Court dehors the Constitution are not constitutional rights, and Congress' exercise
of power under an unequivocal and, in terms, unlimited grant to curb such "discrete"
judicial arrogations can hardly be dismissed as "tawdry sabotage." The current
proposals, he states, "are plainly efforts to undermine the enforcement of prevailing
constitutional doctrine in order to facilitate other, favored substantive outcomes."' 31
Thus, he assumes that "prevailing constitutional doctrine" is legitimate; that it must
be shielded at all costs; that opposing "substantive outcomes" are merely a matter of
taste rather than based on the fundamental principle that the Court, like the other
branches, must stay within constitutional limits; that it is not free to revise the
Constitution by importing values the Framers excluded. For him, the "argument
against such legislation is simple: Congress ordinarily cannot undo the Supreme
Court's constitutional doctrine by simple legislative fiat, and it should not be able to
accomplish the same end by manipulating federal jurisdiction." 132 He "simply" will
not perceive the distinction, drawn by Hamilton, between the power to reverse a
decision, which was not granted, and the power to withdraw jurisdiction to decide,
which was conferred. 133 Sager experiences no difficulty in concluding that the exis-
tence of inferior courts "was left to the discretion of Congress," under the article Ed
provision for "such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish.' 134 What distinguishes "such exceptions . . . as the Congress shall
make"? 135 Why is the former discretionary and the latter not?
B. Cure by Amendment
Sager points out that amendment requires a two-thirds vote as does the override
of a veto, and that " [c]ontrol of jurisdiction as a majoritarian check on the judiciary
does not fit easily into this institutional setting," so that "it makes no sense to single
v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), generally regarded as a mere reflection of the Court's laissez-faire prepossessions,
having no constitutional warrant. Would Congress' withdrawal of jurisdiction of such cases justly be regarded as
"insulating its own unconstitutional conduct"? Such are the perils of "icily abstract" analysis.
And if Congress may not insulate "its own unconstitutional conduct," why does the Court stand higher'? Of the three
branches, Hamilton assured the ratifiers, "the judiciary is next to nothing." THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 504 n.* (A.
Hamilton) (Mod. Libr. ed. 1937). Madison wrote in Federalist No. 51, "In republican government, the legislative
authority necessarily predominates." THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 338 (J. Madison) (Mod. Libr. ed. 1937). Justice
Brandeis referred to the deep-seated conviction of the English and American people that they "must look to representative
assemblies for the protection of their liberties." Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 294-95 (1926) (dissenting opinion
in which Justice Holmes concurred). Elbridge Gerry expressed similar views in the First Congress. See 1 THE RECORDS OF
THE FEDERAL CONVENertON OF 1787, at 97-98 (M. Farrand ed. 1911); and 2 id. at 75.
129. Sager, supra note 1, at 68.
130. Id. at 70 (emphasis added). Since even some activists consider that these decisions have no constitutional
warrant, see supra note 44, they are justly disfavored.
131. Sager, supra note 1, at 68.
132. Id. (footnotes omitted).
133. See supra text accompanying notes 94-108.
134. Sager, supra note 1, at 48; U.S. CONsT. art. III, § I (emphasis added).
135. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
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out one rather bizarre form of legislation to which no supermajority requirement
attaches and make it the last democratic hurrah." 136 The short answer is that the First
Congress read article III in just that "bizarre" fashion. And what is "bizarre" about
giving effect to the express, unequivocal terms of article II when Sager swallows the
Court's continuous amendment of the Constitution, which is without express
sanction?
137
The proper procedure, Sager suggests, is to amend. 138 Activists defend the
Court's extraconstitutional forays on the ground that resort to amendment is too
cumbersome. So, Louis Lusky refers to the Court's "assertion of the power to revise
the Constitution, bypassing the cumbersome amendment procedure prescribed by
Article V." 139 If it is too cumbersome to seek popular consent to judicial alteration of
the Constitution, it is too cumbersome to require the people to reverse judicial
usurpation by amendment. 140 Resort to statutory "exceptions" to correct the Court's
unconstitutional excesses has express constitutional authorization; activist judicial
review has none.
C. Hart's "Essential Function"
Sager considers that removal of jurisdiction "to hear or review constitutional
challenges to State conduct," such as school prayer legislation, "would be subject to
a substantial constitutional objection'--it undercuts the constitutional objective of
"ensur[ing] state compliance with federal constitutional norms," 14 1 again begging
the question of judicial authority to outlaw school prayer legislation. He notes that
this is "a narrowed form of the 'essential function' view of the Supreme Court's
appellate jurisdiction" 142 formulated by Henry Hart: "'exceptions must not be such
as will destroy the essential role of the Supreme Court in the Constitutional
plan.' ,143 That plan did not contemplate judicial revision of the Constitution in order
to invade state sovereignty over local matters reserved to the states.144 As Michael
Perry observes, it is "self-serving in the extreme to suppose" the essential role to be
"anything more than to enforce the value judgments constitutionalized by the
framers." 145
136. Sager, supra note 1, at 39-40.
137. "When the Court disregards the express intent and understanding of the Framers [as with suffrage and
segregation], it has invaded the realm of the political process to which the amending power was committed, and it has
violated the constitutional structure which it is its highest duty to protect." Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 203 (1970)
(Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
138. "Congress can attack Supreme Court decisions by presenting a constitutional amendment to the States for
ratification." Sager, supra note 1, at 39.
139. Lusky, Book Review, 6 HAsTNos CoNsT. L.Q. 403, 406 (1979); see also Kutler, Book Review, 6 HAST'rNGS
CONST. L.Q. 511, 525; P. BiREST, PROCESSES OF CoNsTrrnroNAL DECSIONMAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS 978-79
(1975).
140. Charles Black, a dyed-in-the-wool activist, observes that an amendment "can be thwarted by thirty-four
senators out of a hundred, or by states containing as few as nine million people." He is "staggered by the implied
assertion, or assumption, that such a position can be consonant with the root-ideas and greater sayings of democracy." C.
BLACK, DECtSION ACCORDING TO LAW 38 (1981) (footnotes omitted).
141. Sager, supra note 1, at 43 (emphasis added).
142. Id.
143. Id. (quoting Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic,
66 HARv. L. REv. 1362, 1365 (1953)).
144. See supra text accompanying notes 56-61.
145. M. PuRY, supra note 13, at 133.
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Viewing "essentiality" in the frame of federal conduct, Sager recognizes that
"the sources ... are more equivocal when review of federal conduct is at stake." 146
He notes that "Hart never gave clear shape to his view of the essential function
premise," 47 that there was a large, clear "hole in the Supreme Court's jurisdiction:
for much of the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court could not directly review
federal criminal cases," that the remedy by habeas corpus was "decidedly re-
stricted" and had its own jurisdictional complications.148 He concludes that "[i]f the
essential function claim is understood to require that the Supreme Court itself be able
to review all cases that require federal judicial review, then the Court's toleration of
this hole in its jurisdiction places the claim in jeopardy. ,149 To bolster the "federal
conduct version of the essential function claim," he therefore resorts to the farfetched
analogy furnished by "the constitutional limitation on giving article III business to a
non-article-Ill tribunal," a "point of departure" that he rightly anticipates will raise
his "reader's hackles." 15 Since "Congress' ability to give article III business to
federal tribunals whose judges do not enjoy article III security is limited," Sager
argues, "Congress should be similarly limited in its ability to relegate article III cases
to the state courts, whose judges do not and cannot enjoy article III security."' 51
Precisely such a relegation en masse was made by the First Congress in excluding
federal courts from federal question jurisdiction, which was left to the state courts. 152
Legislative courts, moreover, are not mentioned in the Constitution; they are a ju-
dicial construct and are therefore subject to court-imposed limitations on their own
creation. Congressional control stands on higher ground because the Framers gave it
express sanction without a hint that it might be curtailed in the interest of tenure-
salary protection. Let us consider Sager's explanation under the head of "judicial
independence."
D. Judicial Independence
The keystone of Sager's "essential function" argument is that "[t]he tenure and
compensation provisions of article III manifest a clear commitment to judicial in-
dependence.''153 Let that be admitted, and the question arises: independence for
what? Independence is essential to protect judges who enforce constitutional limita-
tions, but it does not constitute a commission to ride roughshod over rights reserved
146. Sager, supra note 1, at 57.
147. Id. at 57 n.114.
148. Id. at 60 (footnotes omitted).
149. Id. (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 63 (footnotes omitted).
152. "For 125 years, the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction over state cases upholding federal claims of right; for
ninety-six of these years, the lower federal courts lacked federal question jurisdiction. During this period, it was thus
impossible for many cases to reach any federal court." Id. at 36 (footnotes omitted). Contrast Sager's statement:
'Unrestricted use of the state courts as the exclusive forum for article III business is as inconsistent with the constitutional
commitment to a radically independent federal judiciary as would be unrestricted use of article I tribunals." Id. at 64-65.
How is this to be reconciled with the Founders' exclusive commitment of federal question jurisdiction to the state courts,
with large gaps in appellate review?
153. Id. at 61.
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to the states by the tenth amendment.' 5 4 Hamilton wrote that independence was
necessary so that judges could act as "faithful guardians ... [against] legislative
invasions" of the Constitution. 155 Little did the Framers contemplate that the judges
were free to substitute their own "invasions" for those of the legislature. To the
contrary, the Supreme Court declared that the judicial power was "indispensable, not
merely to maintain the supremacy" of federal law "but also to guard the States from
any encroachment upon their reserved rights by the General Goverment." 1 56 The
Framers did not mean the "guardians" to behave after the fashion of a fox guarding a
chicken yard-quite the contrary. The courts, Hamilton states, may not, "on the
pretense of a repugnancy .... substitute their own pleasure to the constitutional
intentions of the legislature";' 57 and by the same token, they may not override the
powers reserved to the states without clear constitutional warrant. He assured the
ratifiers that judges could be impeached for "deliberate usurpations on the authority
of the legislature,"' 5 8 and a fortiori for setting aside the will of the Framers. In-
dependence, in short, was not intended to be a shield for judicial usurpation.
Sager argues that "[tihe framers did not intend to put in article III two major
premises at war with one another." 5 9 The "war" between the tenure-salary pro-
visions and congressional control of jurisdiction is a figment of his imagination. The
First Congress withheld "large portions" of the Court's appellate jurisdiction and all
federal question jurisdiction from the inferior courts,' 60 utterly oblivious to the
alleged incompatibility with judicial independence. Independence requires that
judges be left free to decide causes committed to them; it has no relevance to what
jurisdiction must be conferred upon them. It is late in the day to argue, for example,
that removal of jurisdiction by the Norris-LaGuardia Act to issue labor injunctions
undermined judicial independence. That argument had to wait for Sager.
He observes that "[t]he point of the article III compromise was to give Congress
discretion over the size and shape of the subordinate federal judiciary, and the tenure
and salary provisions should not be read to swallow up this clear understanding."16
The unequivocal grant of power to make "exceptions" is no less clear and no more
"swallowed up" by those provisions. As long as courts remain free to decide cases
that are confided to them, their independence is not "swallowed up." Whether they
should be vested with jurisdiction to decide cases arising in any given jurisdictional
area was left to Congress, as the Court repeatedly has recognized, with never an
intimation that judicial independence was threatened in the slightest.
154. Hamilton affirmed that "every act of a delegated authority, contrary to the tenor of a commission [e.g.,
desegregation] under which it is exercised, is void." THE FEo sAusr No. 78, at 505 (A. Hamilton) (Mod. Libr. ed.
1937).
155. Id. at 509.
156. Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 520 (1859) (emphasis added).
157. Tim FDmERAusr No. 78, at 507 (A. Hamilton) (Mod. Libr. ed. 1937).
158. THE FEDERALST No. 81, at 527 (A. Hamilton) (Mod. Libr. ed. 1937).
159. Sager, supra note 1, at 67.
160. See supra note 152.
161. Sager, supra note 1, at 65.
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E. Uniformity
Sager also attaches great weight to the need for preserving the Court's appellate
jurisdiction in the interest of uniformity: "With the courts of fifty states ruling
independently on the constitutionality of challenged federal programs, the frequent
result would be chaos of a magnitude that we have thus far been unable to produce in
our legal system."16 2 If a choice had to be made between preservation of uniformity
and shielding the Court from congressional correction of its invasion of rights re-
served to the states, there can be little doubt that the Framers would have sacrificed
uniformity. That they did not regard uniformity as indispensable is evidenced by the
following: (1) the Judiciary Act "authorized review of only certain types of state
cases 'arising under' federal law"; 163 (2) "The Court was not granted general powers
to review major criminal federal cases until 1891";164 (3) the First Congress withheld
"large portions of section 2 jurisdiction" from the Court; 165 (4) Hamilton, who had
perceived the need for uniformity in Federalist No. 22,166 nevertheless rejected the
argument that the "'usurpations of the Supreme Court ... will be uncontrollable
and remediless.'"167
Sager himself states that "[iun the context of state court rulings on the con-
stitutionality of state conduct, I think that the need for uniformity is very much
overstated.' ' 168 This takes in most of the areas-segregation, suffrage, death penal-
ties, school prayer-in which judicial interference has engendered hostility, and
where the Court, in the absence of federal legislation, interposed to strike down
"state conduct.' 169 With respect to review of federal conduct, Sager states that
"uniformity and institutional self-defense were matters that could have been safely
entrusted to the discretion of Congress." 7 0 Finally, he states that the Court need not
"itself review state court decisions that repudiate constitutional claims against state
conduct" and that it would suffice to provide "effective supervision of state conduct
by employing the existing lower federal judiciary." 17' Hamilton was more specific:
"instead of being carried to the Supreme Court, [appeals] may be made to lie from
the State courts to district courts of the Union." 172 The decisions of the district courts
are by no means uniform.
162. Id. at 40 (footnotes omitted).
163. Sager, supra note 1, at 53 n.105.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 31. See supra text accompanying note 77.
166. THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 138-39 (A. Hamilton) (Mod. Libr. ed. 1937).
167. THE FEDERALtST No. 81, at 523 (A. Hamilton) (Mod. Libr. ed. 1937).
168. Sager, supra note 1, at 40 n.67 (emphasis in original).
169. See supra note 59.
170. Sager, supra note 1, at 57.
171. Id. at 56.




Sager considers that "divestiture of both state and federal jurisdiction would
create fatal due process problems." '7 3 Although he regards the due process clause as
"vague and abstract,"' 7 4 he does not pause to inquire how rights expressly reserved
to the states by the tenth amendment can be curtailed under cover of "vague"
language. The Founders scarcely contemplated that the fifth amendment would con-
stitute an instrument for emasculating the tenth. Rather, the fifth was meant to apply
to delegated powers and "constitutional" rights, not to those created by the Court
without constitutional warrant. In truth, the clause is "vague" only for those whose
purposes are served by vagueness. Summarizing 400 years of English history, Hamil-
ton stated on the eve of the Convention that "[t]he words 'due process' have a precise
technical import, and are only applicable to the process and proceedings of the courts
of justice; they can never be referred to an act of legislature."'-7 5 Charles P. Curtis,
whose Lions Under the Throne'7 6 is a paean to the Justices, said that the meaning of
due process in the fifth amendment "was as fixed and definite as the common law
could make a phrase .... It meant a procedural due process . . . . ,,177 The mean-
ing of due process in the fourteenth amendment is the same as in the fifth.
178
Consequently, the Court may not in the name of due process invalidate a statute. The
Court itself declared in Davidson v. New Orleans,179 per Justice Miller, that the
Barons did not by Magna Carta's "law of the land" intend to "protect themselves
against the enactment of laws" by Parliament. 18' They sought protection against
arbitrary deprivations by King John without the shelter of judicial proceedings under
standing law. One who was brought to trial had to be charged with violation of a
"standing law" and to have a fair trial of the issues posed by that law; but a change in
the "standing law" after trial nowise violated due process. 18 ' There is not the faintest
173. Sager, supra note 1, at 41 n.70. I was of the same opinion in 1969; but more extended research and reflection
led me to change my view. For detailed explanation see R. BERGER, DEATH PENALTIES, supra note 10, at 158-72.
Sager also invokes "the equal protection tradition of the fifth amendment's due process clause." Sager, supra note 1,
at 78. That "tradition" was born in Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), wherein Chief Justice Warren, his
biographer tells us, said that segregation "was being outlawed because its continuance was 'unthinkable' after the
outlawing of segregation in the states in Brown. That argument made sense primarily as an ethical proposition." G.
WHrm, supra note 17, at 227. In terms of constitutional analysis it compounded the rape of the fourteenth amendment,
from which the framers had excluded segregation, by reading into the fifth amendment the equal protection of the
fourteenth. An ardent admirer and former clerk of Warren, John Hart Ely, condemned this as "gibberish both syn-
tactically and historically." J. ELY, DEMocRAcy AND DIsTRusT 32 (1980). Some tradition!
174. Sager, supra note 1, at 44.
175. 4 THE PAPERs OF ALEXANDER HAtLTON 35 (H. Syrett & J. Cooke eds. 1962) (emphasis in original); see
generally Berger, "Law of the Land" Reconsidered, 74 Nw. U.L. REv. 1 (1979).
176. C. CuR-ts, LIONS UNDER THE THRONE (1947).
177. Curtis, Review and Majority Rule, in SUPREME COURT AND Sui'Rman LAW 170, 177 (E. Cahn ed. 1954). The
Court itself confessed error, referring to "our abandonment of the 'vague contours' of the Due Process Clause to nullify
laws which a majority of the Court believed to be economically unwise." Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731 (1963)
(footnotes omitted). "We have returned," it said, "to the original constitutional principle that courts do not substitute
their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of the legislative bodies, who are elected to pass laws." Id. at 730.
178. See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 535 (1884).
179. 96 U.S. 97 (1877).
180. Id. at 102.
181. See Berger, "Law of the Land" Reconsidered, 74 Nw. U.L. REv. 1, 2-5, 29-30 (1979).
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historical foundation for an argument that Magna Carta rendered Parliament power-
less to change "standing law."
An attempt to insulate decisions that unconstitutionally' 82 strike down state
statutes on the ground that a claimant is entitled to a fair trial on such issues is the
sheerest bootstrap lifting. To insist that a claimant of a right created by judicial
arrogation must be given a judicial hearing for assertion of that right is to maintain
that the Court must be allowed to pass on its own violation of the Constitution, to be
the judge in its own cause for the insulation of judicial wrongdoing.
Whatever may be the limitations of congressional power under article I, so far
as rights are asserted against the states under the fourteenth amendment, they are
subject to section 5, which, as "the last expression of the will of the lawmaker,
prevails over an earlier one."1 83 Section 5 provides, "Congress shall have power to
enforce . . . the provisions of this article." '1 84 Giving effect to the negative pregnant,
the Court emphasized in Exparte Virginia 85 that this power was given to Congress,
not the courts,1 86 as a number of Justices have reemphasized.'8 7 Judicial enforcement
against the will of Congress would convert "Congress shall" into "the Court shall,"
usurping a power withheld, for discretion to enforce was left to Congress. Section 5
does not provide that "Congress shall enforce," but rather that "Congress shall have
power to enforce."' 8 8 Elsewhere I have collected the historical evidence that the
framers meant to exclude the Court from making "political decisions."' 8 9 Comment-
ing on section 2 of the fifteenth amendment, the analogue of section 2 of the four-
teenth, Senator Oliver Morton, a framer of the fourteenth, stated that "the remedy for
the violation of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments was expressly not left to the
courts," but was to "be enforced by legislation on the part of Congress. "' 90 Senator
Matthew Carpenter said, "We must legislate, and then commit the enforcement of
our laws to the Federal tribunals . . . . '9' What Congress "commits" it can with-
draw.
Moreover, the due process clause, like other provisions of section 1, is governed
by section 5. The clause is one of the "provisions" that "Congress shall have power
182. In Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), the Court, per Justice Brandeis, branded the doctrine of Swift
v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), as an "'unconstitutional assumption of powers by courts of the United States which
no lapse of time or respectable array of opinion should make us hesitate to correct."' 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938) (quoting
Black & WhiteTaxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518,533 (1928) (Holmes,
J., dissenting)).
183. Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 68-69 (1904).
184. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (emphasis added).
185. 100 U.S. 339 (1879).
186. Id. at 345.
187. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 678-79 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting); United
States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 783 n.7 (1966) (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Warren, C.J., and Douglas, J.).
188. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (emphasis added). In Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (separate
opinion), Justice Douglas declared that "[the manner of enforcement involves discretion; but that discretion is largely [in
fact, entirely] entrusted to the Congress, not to the courts." Id. at 143. Justice Iredell stated that where the legislators
"only exercise a discretion expressly confided to them by the constitution .... [i]t is a discretion no more con-
troulable... by a Court... than a judicial determination is by them .... "Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 266
(1796).
189. See R. BRGER, DEATH PENALTIES, supra note 10, at 169-70.
190. CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 2d Sess. 525 (1872) (emphasis added).
191. Id. at 897 (emphasis added).
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to enforce." Consequently, even the due process clause comes into play only after
Congress exercises that "power" and "commits" enforcement of the clause to the
courts. To require a judicial trial against the will of Congress would be to take over
the power granted to Congress alone, thereby depriving section 5 of its intended
effect. In short, the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment is subordinate to
section 5, for the framers left it in the discretion of Congress whether to provide an
enforcement proceeding.'
92
G. Jurisdiction to Decide Jurisdiction
"Courts and commentators," Sager notes, "agree that Congress' discretion in
granting jurisdiction to the lower federal courts implies that those courts take jurisdic-
tion from Congress and not from article 11I." 193 The "lower federal courts do not
have a constitutional grant of jurisdiction on which to fall back. Still, this structural
embarrassment does not render the lower courts as vulnerable to congressional bully-
ing as one might suppose."' 9 4 His escape hatch is "jurisdiction to decide ju-
risdiction.', 195 Recognizing that a court "cannot generate its own jurisdiction," that
"jurisdiction has to come from some external source-typically the relevant constitu-
tion or legislature"' 19 6-he considers that the "court's responsibilities as a court
within our constitutional scheme would require it to invalidate a restriction on its
capacity to measure its grants of jurisdiction against the Constitution." 197 This he
deduces from the postulate that "[a]s long as the district court continues to exist as a
court, it enjoys jurisdiction to determine whether it has jurisdiction. Without such
pump-priming jurisdiction, a court could not function . ,,198 But a district court
"exists as a court" by the grace of Congress; such existence does not generate its
own jurisdiction. 199 "Jurisdiction to decide jurisdiction," Sager recognizes, is "not
self-generated; it is implicit in the grant or grants of jurisdiction upon which the court
is founded." 2° How can an "implicit" grant survive the withdrawal of the express
grant from which it is derived? It is part and parcel of the express grant and falls with
it. Otherwise the "implicit" grant would authorize the court to defeat withdrawal of
the express grant. 201 Although the 1789 Judiciary Act withheld all federal question
jurisdiction, no district court ever questioned the constitutionality of that withholding
192. ITlhe jurisdiction having been conferred [by Congress on the inferior courts] may, at the will of Congress,
be taken away in whole or in part; and if withdrawn... all pending cases though cognizable when commenced
must fall. A right which thus comes into existence only by virtue of an act of Congress, and which may be
withdrawn by an act of Congress after its exercise has begun, cannot well be described as a constitutional right.
Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 234 (1922) (citations omitted).
193. Sager, supra note I, at 25 (footnote omitted).
194. Id. at 26.
195. Id. at 22.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 27.
198. Id. at 26.
199. Sager observes that the "existence" of the inferior courts "was left to the discretion of Congress." Id. at 48
(footnote omitted).
200. Id. at 22.
201. See supra note 192.
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(which stands on the same plane as a withdrawal) by virtue of its jurisdiction to
decide jurisdiction. Sager overlooks what McCardle held:
What, then, is the effect of the repealing act upon the case before us? We cannot
doubt as to this. Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause.
Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function
remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause. 202
Next Sager turns to "the possibility that the lower courts can fall back on the
statutory grants of jurisdiction that they enjoyed before Congress employed the
limitation." 20 3 Assuming that Congress "does not intend to dismantle the federal
judiciary," 204 he argues that the
strong likelihood that the pre-existing general grants of jurisdiction would survive an
unconstitutional attempt to limit them.., enables the lower courts to strike down the
offending limitation and to hear the excluded case in exercise of their surviving jurisdic-
tion. This is in fact what took place in the wake of United States v. Klein.20 5
Klein, we have seen, merely rejected Congress' attempt to "prescribe a rule for the
decision of a cause in a particular way" 20 6 for a case that had already been decided; it
did not involve a withdrawal of jurisdiction.20 7 On Sager's reasoning, once a grant of
general jurisdiction is made, Congress is powerless to withdraw particular subject
matters except with the consent of the courts. That would undo Congress' plenary
power over the jurisdiction of the inferior federal courts; and it conflicts with the
holding of McCardle and of Kline v. Burke Construction Co. 20 8 "Surviving jurisdic-
tion" allows the district courts to decide subject matter cases that Congress left
untouched, not to resist particular withdrawals from the general grant.
IV. CONCLUSION
Sager's attack on Congress' control of federal jurisdiction is a tapestry of cob-
webs. In essence, he urges that the unequivocal terms of article III cannot mean what
they say.2° 9 The legislative history lends him cold comfort; from its silence he would
wrest an inference that the Framers could not so drastically have altered their scheme
of judicial review,2 10 overlooking that the Framers regarded the proposed federal
judiciary with far more apprehension than does Sager21' and at most authorized it to
police the constitutional boundaries, 212 not to redraw them. The Judiciary Act of
202. Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1869) (emphasis added); see also supra note 192.
203. Sager, supra note 1, at 27.
204. Id. at 28.
205. Id. at 29 (footnote omitted).
206. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146 (1872).
207. See supra text accompanying notes 94-104.
208. See supra notes 202 & 192 and accompanying text.
209. See Sager, supra note I, at 42, 44-45.
210. See supra note 37.
211. See supra note 50. The exclusion of the lower courts from the federal question jurisdiction is one item of
evidence. Another is Hamilton's assurance that of the three branches "the judiciary is next to nothing." THE FEDEaLSr
No. 78, at 504 n.* (A. Hamilton) (Mod. Libr. ed. 1937).
212. R. BERGER, CONoRSS, supra note 52, at 13-16. For John Marshall's statement in the Virginia Ratification
Convention, see id. at 16 n.39.
[Vol. 44:611
SAGER'S "COURT-STRIPPING" POLEMIC
1789, enacted by the First Congress, which was privy to the Framers' intention,
stands like a roadblock before every branch of Sager's arguments. It withheld the
entire "arising under" jurisdiction from the lower courts and, by Sager's own testi-
mony, left large gaps and gaping holes in the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court.2 13 The few particularized removals proposed by current bills do not remotely
approach the 1789 Act's wholesale withholding. Manifestly, the First Congress did
not consider that it was "unravel[ling] one of the most basic aspects of the con-
stitutional scheme."214 Its construction was immediately accepted by the Court, and
in no case has the Court repudiated its unbroken line of decisions. A prior attempt to
distinguish those cases dismissed them as "dicta"; 2 15 but 175 years of dicta by
respected Justices, in which a unanimous Court joined, may be preferred to Sager's
novel and palpably untenable readings. He has journeyed far afield for analogies, but
in vain; the cases simply are not to be shrivelled by his theorizing. He concedes that
"two hundred years of consistent behavior by Congress and the Supreme Court"
indicate that Congress has "at least some power to limit the Court's jurisdiction." 216
What are the boundaries of that power? Sager's attempts to frame limitations on the
plenary grant to Congress are, in my judgment, fruitless.
By all but exclusively focusing on the proposed congressional cure while reso-
lutely shutting his eyes to the disease, Sager recalls a comment by a member of the
House of Commons in 1742 (when it was considering an inquiry into the fallen
regime of Robert Walpole): "Would not a Physician be a Madman, to prescribe to a
Patient, without first examining into the State of his Distemper, the Causes from
which it arose." 217 Sager has not paused to inquire into the causes which led Con-
gress to propose its cure-the substitution by the Justices of their predilections for the
Framers' choices. That is the cardinal problem going to the roots of our democratic
system-the right of the people, however misguided, to govern themselves.
Now we have a study which lays bare with startling clarity what hitherto has
only been a subject of inference and surmise-the process whereby Chief Justice
Warren, that beau ideal of activist Justices, identified his personal beliefs with con-
stitutional mandates. It has been noted that Warren "was never concerned with
constitutional text or intention. Rather he believed that his job as a judge lay in
discovering and articulating the 'ethical imperatives' he felt were (or should be)
embedded in the Constitution for what it provided or its Framers intended.' 218 That
substitution is catalogued by his worshipful biographer, G. Edward White, in
fascinating detail, and because it is rarely acknowledged by most academicians and
generally concealed from the public, 21 9 it deserves to be highlighted. Warren's lip
213. See supra note 78, and text accompanying note 149.
214. Sager. supra note 1, at 51.
215. Ratner, Congressional Power over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 157,
173-83 (1960). But see supra note 73.
216. Sager, supra note 1, at 33.
217. 13 THE HISTORY AND PROCEEDINGS OF TiE HOUSE OF COMMONS 85 (R. Chandler ed. 1743).
218. See supra note 17.
219. In the midst of Franklin Roosevelt's Court-packing plan (1937), Professor Felix Frankfurter wrote him:
"People have been taught to believe that when the Supreme Court speaks it is not they who speak but the Constitution,
whereas, of course, in so many vital cases, it is they who speak and not the Constitution." ROOSEVELT AND
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service to "the limits of the Constitution" was at odds with his actions, as Trop v.
Dulles220 exemplifies. While purporting to "apply those limits as the Constitution
prescribes them,"-22' he was in fact rewriting them to fit his private notions of "the
dignity of man."222
At issue was the constitutionality of an act expatriating a citizen for desertion of
the armed forces in time of war. For Warren, citizenship was "man's basic right," 223
though, as White notes, it had no "support in the case law," and "there was no
indication in the Constitution that citizenship was a specially protected right that
could not be divested, let alone that it was a fundamental right.' '224 Since "five
justices had rejected his view of citizenship," he invoked the eighth amendment:
expatriation was a cruel and unusual punishment.22 5 But banishment had been a
staple of English law and that of the Revolutionary American states.226 Warren
reasoned, however, that expatriation destroyed the "political existence" 227 of the
individual, though as White remarks, the language of the Constitution
suggested that a political existence could be restricted to qualified persons .... Warren,
in short, had made no serious effort... to analyze the doctrinal history or the current
doctrinal status of the Eighth Amendment. He had simply asserted that since citizenship
was man's most basic right, involuntary expatriation was necessarily a cruel and unusual
punishment.228
Thus he substituted what he felt the law should be for the unvarying English and
American law to the contrary.
Warren's most spectacular decision-Brown v. Board of Education,229 the de-
segregation case-was to serve as his inspiration for future forays. That decency
called for an end to the detestable practice must not obscure the fact that the Constitu-
tion does not authorize the Court to strike it down.230 Judicial revision of the Con-
stitution for benign purposes is not its own justification. Addressing a judge's resort
to his "individual sense of justice," Cardozo wrote, "That might result in a be-
nevolent despotism if the judges were benevolent men. It would put an end to the
FRANKFURTER: THEIR CORRESPONDENCE 1928-1945, at 383 (M. Freedman ed. 1967) (emphasis in original). See also
Kauper, The Supreme Court: Hybrid Organ of State, 21 Sw. L.J. 573, 57940 (1967). Michael Perry remarks, "After all,
it is a radical thing to say, and a thing not often said, that the source ofjudgment is the judge's own values." M. PERRY,
supra note 13, at 123. Martin Shapiro wrote, "It would be fantastic indeed if the Supreme Court, in the name of sound
scholarship, were to disavow publicly the myth on which its power rests." M. SHAPIRO, LAW AND POLrIcs IN THE
SUPREME COURT 27 (1964). It is not "scholarship," but obedience to constitutional limitations that calls for candid
renunciation of unauthorized practices.
220. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
221. Id. at 104. See supra text accompanying notes 14-16.
222. 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958). For detailed discussion of Trop v. Dulles see R. BERGER, DEATH PENALTIES, supra
note 10, at 116-22.
223. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 64 (1958) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
224. G. WHITE, supra note 17, at 233-34.
225. Id. at 232.
226. See R. BERGER, DEATH PENALTIEs, supra note 10, at 117.
227. 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
228. G. WHTrr, supra note 17, at 233 (emphasis added).
229. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
230. See supra note 43.
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reign of law." 2 3 Our system is committed to "Equal Justice Under Law" not to
"Justices Above the Law." They were not authorized to revise the Constitution in the
interests of "justice."
Two of the most practiced constitutional lawyers on the Court, Justices
Frankfurter and Jackson, "were hardpressed to find an adequate rationale for overrul-
ing Plessy [v. Ferguson]."'232 Frankfurter had suggested that "nothing in the Four-
teenth Amendment prevented racial segregation in the states,"233 a view that even
activist academicians have now been constrained to accept.234 Warren began with
rejecting the "premise that blacks were inferior to whites" and hence "was prepared
to invalidate segregation."2 35 As Warren saw it, "The practice of racial segregation
in the public schools ... was immoral and therefore wrong; the Court's duty was to
eradicate it .... [I]f the doctrinal analysis offended, he would modify it or delete
it" 23 6 -a short and easy way with constitutional obstacles. The Brown opinion,
White remarks, "declared racial segregation unconstitutional through appeal to con-
temporary social perceptions rather than to constitutional doctrine. "237 But that
approach had been rejected at the very outset by Hamilton: "Until the people have,
by some solemn and authoritative act [amendment], annulled or changed the es-
tablished form, it is binding ... and no presumption, or even knowledge, of their
sentiments, can warrant their representatives in a departure from it, prior to such an
act.",238
The "social perceptions" were Warren's, not those of the people for whom he
purported to speak, as is illustrated in the Court's rejection of Jackson's plea that they
tell the people they were "declaring new law for a new day,"' 239 well knowing that
such an admission would raise a fire storm. Activists acknowledge that in 1954 it
would have been impossible to procure an amendment barring segregation in the
schools; 240 since then racism has been exacerbated. 24 1 White states, "The ideal
behind Brown-the intuitive justice of equality of opportunity-was an ideal not
231. B. CARDooO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROcEss 136 (1921). Lord Mansfield said that "[w]hatever
doubts I may have in my own breast with respect to the policy and expedience of this law.... I am bound to see it
executed according to its meaning." Pray v. Edie, 99 Eng. Rep. 1113, 1114 (1786).
232. G. WHrrt, supra note 17, at 162.
233. Id. at 166.
234. See supra note 40.
235. G. WroT=, supra note 17, at 165.
236. Id. at 228. On the other hand, Chief Justice Marshall declared that "the constitution ... was not intended to
furnish the corrective for every abuse of power which may be committed by the state governments." Providence Bank v.
Billings, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 514, 563 (1830).
237. G. WHIE, supra note 17, at 170.
238. THE FEn.RA=ST No. 78, at 509 (A. Hamilton) (Mod. Libr. ed. 1937). For the Framers this was a basic
postulate. See infra text accompanying note 282.
239. R. KLuGER, SmtPL JuslcF 681 (1976). In a file memorandum Jackson wrote, "[Despite my personal
satisfaction with the Court's (forthcoming] judgment, I simply can not find, in surveying all the usual sources of law,
anything which warrants me in saying that it is required by the original purpose and intent of the Fourteenth or Fifth
Amendment." Id. at 689.
240. Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. Rev. 204, 237 (1980). Edmond
Cahs stated that "as a practical matter it would have been impossible to secure adoption of a constitutional amendment to
abolish 'separate but equal."' Cahn, Jursiprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. REv. 150, 156 (1955).
241. For citations see R. BERGER, GovERNmr BY JUDICIARY, supra note 43, at 327-28.
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explicitly codified in the Constitution. "22 That is a masterly understatement, for the
framers of the fourteenth amendment restricted equality to a very narrow category of
rights: to contract, own property, and have access to the courts.243 Senator William
Fessenden, Chairman of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, said, "[W]e cannot
put into the Constitution, owing to existing prejudices and existing institutions, an
entire exclusion of all class distinctions . . . ,,24' So too, Thaddeus Stevens, the
implacable opponent of discrimination, lamented that he had hoped so to remodel
"all our institutions as to have freed them from every vestige of ... inequality of
rights, . . .[so] that no distinction would be tolerated. . . .This bright dream has
vanished . "...,,24' Thus the leaders confessed that complete equality was legisla-
tively unattainable, as in fact the repeated rejection of attempts to ban all discrimina-
tion attested.24 6 That is a deplorable, but nonetheless undeniable, historical fact. It is
open to the people to alter it by an amendment-the course activists so blithely
recommend to proponents of congressional control of jurisdiction. No power of
amendment was granted to the Court.
What Warren regarded as the jewel in his crown,247 the reapportionment de-
cision,248 proceeded in the teeth of the framers' incontrovertible exclusion of suffrage
from the fourteenth amendment. 249 White notes that "the right to vote was sharply
qualified at the time of the framing of the Constitution, '" 250 and adds, "If the states
were not prohibited by the Constitution from restricting the right to vote itself ... it
would seem to suggest that 'the right to vote freely' was not initially regarded as
something essential to a representative form of goverment.' 251 Warren, however,
asserted "that a constitutional right to have one's vote counted equally existed" and
that a denial of that right violates "'the essence of a democratic society.' "252 White
comments,
Warren had based his purported usurpation of legislative prerogatives on an in-
terpretation of the Constitution that was neither faithful to its literal text nor consistent
with the context in which it had been framed. He had substituted homilies such as
'[c]itizens, not history or economic interests, cast votes' for doctrinal analysis.253
242. G. WttrE, supra note 17, at 170..
243. For the massive evidence, see R. BERGER, GovERNmENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 43, at 117-33.
244. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 705 (1866).
245. Id. at 3148.
246. See R. BERGER, GovERNiENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 43, at 163-64.
247. G. Wtnim, supra note 17, at 238.
248. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
249. Justice Harlan reminded the Court that its reapportionment decisions were "made in the face of irrefutable and
still unanswered history to the contrary." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965) (concurring opinion).
Activist Louis Lusky refers to Harlan's "irrefutable and unrefuted demonstration" to that effect. Lusky, Book Review, 6
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 403, 406 (1979). See also Abraham, Book Review, id. at 467-68; Mendelson, Book Review, id.
at 453; Nathanson, Book Review, 56 TEx. L. REv. 579, 581 (1978). Gerald Gunther wrote,
The ultimate justification for the Reynolds ruling is hard, if not impossible, to set forth in constitutionally
legitimate terms. It rests, rather, on the view that courts are authorized to step in when injustices exist and other
institutions fail to act. That is a dangerous-and I think illegitimate--prescription for judicial action.
Gunther, Some Reflections on the Judicial Role: Distinctions, Roots and Prospects, 1979 WAsH. U.L.Q. 817, 825.
250. G. WHrrE, supra note 17, at 236.
251. Id. at 238.
252. Id. (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964)).
253. G. WttrrE, supra note 17, at 239 (footnote omitted) (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 580 (1964)).
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The "history" Warren dismissed was the framers' determination to exclude suffrage
from the fourteenth amendment. Let White sum up: "[I]n none of the leading activist
Warren Court decisions was a constitutional mandate obvious. Brown v. Board of
Education reversed a long-established precedent on the basis of social science evi-
dence. Baker v. Carr found a judicial power to review the political judgments of
legislators where none had previously existed."-25 4 He concludes, "[W]hen one
divorces Warren's opinions from their ethical premises, they evaporate .... [T]hey
are individual examples of [Warren's own] beliefs leading to judgments." 25 5
His thinking was colored by yet another high-handed notion-that the meaning
of constitutional terms changes with the times. "The Bill of Rights needed revision
with time. 'We will pass on,' Warren said, a 'document [that] will not have exactly
the same meaning it had when we received it from our fathers.' "256 Thereby he laid
claim to the prerogative of Humpty-Dumpty: "When I use a word .... it means just
what I choose it to mean."257 A judge who pours his own meaning into constitutional
terms lays claim to power to amend the Constitution, as Chief Justice Taney per-
ceived: "If in this court we are at liberty to give old words new meanings .... there
is no power which may not, by this mode of construction, be conferred on the general
government and denied to the States." 258 In this he echoed Madison and Jefferson.2 59
And it remained the view of the Reconstruction Congress. In 1872 a unanimous
Senate Judiciary Committee Report, signed by Senators who had voted for the four-
teenth amendment, stated, "A construction which should give the phrase... a
meaning differing from the sense in which it was understood and employed by the
254. G. WnrrE, supra note 17, at 357.
255. Id. at 367.
256. Id. at 223 (emphasis added). His friend Justice Black tartly dismissed "rhapsodical strains, about the duty of
the Court to keep the Constitution in tune with the times.... The Constitution makers knew the need for change and
provided for it" by the amendment process of article V. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 522 (1965) (dissenting
opinion). In a 1784 pamphlet Thomas Tudor Tucker of South Carolina wrote that the Constitution "should prescribe the
limits of all delegated power. It should be declared to be... unalterable by any authority but the express consent of a
majority of the citizens collected by such regular mode as may be therein provided." G. WooD, THE CREAtION OF THE
ArMaucAN REtUBLic 1776-1787, at 281 (1969). Wood commented that this "remarkable" pamphlet "summed up what
Americans had done in two decades to the conception of a constitution .... It was a conclusive statement that has not
essentially changed in two hundred years." Id. at 280-81.
In the Convention, George Mason said, "The plan now to be formed will certainly be defective .... Amendments
therefore will be necessary, and it will be better to provide for them, in an easy, regular and Constitutional way .... " I
Tim REcoRDs OF TE FEDERAL CoNvuErmoN OF 1787, at 202-03 (M. Farrand ed. 1911). He considered article V
dangerous because the amendment process required initiation by Congress, so that "the whole people of America can't
make, or even propose alterations to it." 2 id., at 629 n.8. Activists would endow the Court with a power denied to the
people themselves without congressional intervention.
257. L. CARROLL, THROuon Tm LoowGc GLAss 163 (Norton ed. 1971) (emphasis in original). John Hart Ely
considers that we am not "free to make the Constitution mean whatever we please." Ely, The Supreme Court 1977
Term-Foreword: On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 HARv. L. REv. 5 (1978).
258. Smith v. Tumer (The Passenger Cases), 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 478 (1849).
259. If "the sense in which the Constitution was accepted and ratified by the nation... be not the guide in
expounding it, there can be no security ... for a faithful exercise of its powers." 9 THE WPrrNos OF JAms MADISON
191 (G. Hunt ed. 1900-1910). Jefferson pledged as President to administer the Constitution "according to the safe and
honest meaning contemplated by the plain understanding of the people at the time of its adoption." 4 DEBATs iN T
SEVERAL STATE CoNvmcnoNs ON THE ADOPTION OF m FEDERAL CONSTrTrmON 446 (J. Elliott ed. 1827-30 & photo.
reprint 1941) (quoted by John Rutledge) (emphasis in original). Such was also Chief Justice Marshall's view: if a word
was understood in a certain sense "when the constitution was framed.... Itihe convention must have used it in that
sense," and it is that sense which is to be given judicial effect. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 190 (1824).
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people when they adopted the Constitution, would be as unconstitutional as a de-
parture from the plain and express language of the Constitution. .... ,260
Warren strikingly verifies Douglas' frank avowal that in constitutional adjudica-
tion "the 'gut' reaction of a judge ... was the main ingredient of his decision." 261
In White's words, "[t]he ethical imperatives that guided Warren as a judge reflected
his personal morality" ;262 his "justifications for a result were often conclusory state-
ments of what he perceived to be ethical imperatives."- 263 Often those imperatives
were at war with those of the people. 264 The idiosyncratic, nakedly personal nature of
his imperatives is revealed by Marchetti v. United States,265 in which he decided that
gamblers should not receive the protection accorded other taxpayers by the fifth
amendment's self-incrimination clause. "[T]here is no evidence," White correctly
comments, that the clause "was designed to protect only innocent persons, only some
guilty persons, or the disclosure of only some 'incriminating' activities."- 266 "It is
hard to see," he says, why the law should not "be the same for gamblers as for other
taxpayers.' 267 "At a point," White comments, "Warren's concern with ethical
imperatives comes so close to what appears to be an apology for subjective prefer-
ences in judging as to be unsupportable. "268 For, White observes, a judge has not
been appointed "with an expectation that he will simply use his power to do what he
thinks is fair and just.' ,269 In the past, liberals derisively compared such adjudication
to a caliph dispensing justice under a tree. "On the contrary," White continues, "a
judge is expected to 'follow the law,' 'uphold the Constitution,' [he is sworn to do so]
and otherwise subordinate his personal preferences to some more legitimized body of
wisdom." ' 270 When he fails to do so, he may be said to be "betraying a trust."'27
Thus, White has richly confirmed Anthony Lewis' early evaluation of Warren:
"'[T]he closest thing the United States has had to a Platonic Guardian, dispensing
law from a throne without any sensed limits of power except what was seen [by him]
260. S. REP. No. 21, 42nd Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1872), reprinted in THE RECONSTRUCIZON AmENDMENTs' DEBATES
571 (A. Avins ed. 1967).
261. W. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARs, 1939-1975, at 8 (1981).
262. G. WHITE, supra note 17, at 218.
263. Id. at 230. Philip Kurland had made the point in 1977: "'History may yet decide' that Warren's chief
justiceship was essentially one where 'political power, including judicial power, was... exercised for the advancement
of what was "right and good" as [Warren's] personal ideolog[y] defined those... terms."' Id. at 220 (quoting Kurland,
Book Review, 87 Yale L.J. 225, 233 (1977) (emphasis in original)).
264. School prayer and busing, for example.
265. 390 U.S. 39 (1968).
266. G. Wi'r, supra note 17, at 361.
267. Id. at 365.
268. Id. at 362. "The difficulty is that an approach based on ethics seems inevitably to lead one to justification of
one's ethical stance .... " Id. at 365. Ely has convincingly demonstrated that a divorce between a judge's personal
values and the social consensus is delusory, that what he is "really. . . 'discovering' . . . are his own values." Ely, The
Supreme Court, 1977 Term-Foreword: On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 HAv. L. RFv. 5, 16 (1978). Ely notes
that "'Lenin used to claim this godlike gift of divination of the people's "real" interests.' Id. at 51 n.198. (quoting H.
MAYO, AN INTRODUCTION To DEMocR.A7c THEORY 97 (1960)).
269. G. WHm'E, supra note 17, at 364.
270. Id. at 364-65.
271. Id. at 365.
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as the good of society.'" 272 Warren's judicial conduct violated Cardozo's precept: a
judge "is not a knight-errant, roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or
of goodness. He is to draw his inspiration from consecrated principles." 273 Even less
is he to overturn constitutional text or the unmistakable intention of the Framers
because they do not conform to his "ethical imperatives."
Finally, a brief comment on White's approach to these facts. He is to be warmly
commended for his forthright appraisal of what Warren was doing. But he errs, in my
judgment, in regarding doubts about Warren's course as merely a matter of taste, a
choice between opposing doctrinal premises: "In an area as open-ended and suscep-
tible to change as constitutional interpretation, who can say that Warren's approach,
which settled on the ethically dictated result first and derived traditional justifications
later, is less sound than an approach conditioning results on the emergence of 'princi-
pled' reasoning?" '274 That antiseptic statement obscures that Warren displaced the
framers' choices with his own; that he overturned their determination, for example, to
leave suffrage to the states, a course that cannot be "derived" from "traditional
justifications." White also instances a "line of influential critics in the twentieth
century" who rejected Brown v. Board of Education because "its reasoning was
illegitimate . . . .No one wanted to defend 'separate but equal' segregation on moral
grounds, but nothing in the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause pre-
vented the practice; to invalidate it on the basis of dubious empirical research was the
essence of unbridled judicial glossing of the Constitution," an example of flawed
"reasoning." 275 Warren proceeded in the opposite direction, seeking to determine
"the ethically required resolution of a given case.''276 White observes that "if one
deplores Warren's choice, one might question what empowers him to pick and
choose," 2 77 or more concretely, to ignore the constitutional text or proceed in spite of
the unmistakable intention of the framers to exclude suffrage and segregation from
the fourteenth amendment. That is the issue, not "whether ignoring the established
jurisprudential canons of judicial performance . . . constitutes 'bad' judicial
reasoning. ' 278 The issue is whether judges are indeed, as Paul Brest asserts, not
"bound by the text or original understanding of the Constitution." 279 That is far more
than a matter of taste in jurisprudential canons or "principled reasoning"; it involves
the Court's violation, in the words of Justice Harlan, of the very "constitutional
structure [of government] which it is its highest duty to protect. 280 Since that lesson
apparently has been lost on Sager as well as White, I may be indulged for rehearsing a
few elementary constitutional facts.
272. Id. at 359 (quoting Lewis, Earl Warren, in 4 THE JUStIcEs OF THE UNTrrED STATES SUPREME COURT 1789-
1969, at 2726 (1969)).
273. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 141 (1921).
274. G. WHrrE, supra note 17, at 363-64.
275. Id. at 360-61.
276. Id. at 361.
277. Id. at 365.
278. Id. at 236.
279. Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REv. 204, 224 (1980).
280. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 203 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting).
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Fearful of power, the Founders resorted to a written Constitution in order to
define and limit it.28 1 Their presuppositions were well summarized by Philip Kur-
land:
The concept of the written constitution is that it defines the authority of government and
its limits, that government is the creature of the constitution and cannot do what it does not
authorize .... A priori, such a constitution could only have a fixed and unchanging
meaning, if it were to fulfill its function. For changed conditions, the instrument itself
made provision for amendment which, in accordance with the concept of a written con-
stitution, was expected to be the only form of change .... 282
First and last, the "limited" Constitution was meant to "bind down" our delegates
"from mischief by the chains of the Constitution.' '283 Very early, Chief Justice
Marshall, who had been a proponent of judicial review in the Virginia Ratification
Convention, declared that a written constitution was designed to define and limit
power; he asked, "To what purpose are powers limited, . . . if these limits may, at
any time, be passed by those intended to be restrained?" 284 Among those to be
restrained he included the courts, 285 later specifically disclaiming a judicial "right to
change [the] instrument.", 286 As we have seen, even Warren affirmed that "[w]e
must apply those limits as the Constitution prescribes them.' '287
In turning his back on those limits in the interest of his personal morality,
Warren fell within Justice Harlan's charge that "when the Court disregards the
express intent and understanding of the Framers, it has invaded the realm of the
political process to which the amending power was committed, and it has violated the
constitutional structure which it is its highest duty to protect.' '288 That had much
earlier been forcibly stated by Justice Story:
281. "Out of this fear of absolute power arose a revolutionary contribution to the idea of establishing constitutions,
i.e. from 1776 on constitutions were to be written." Sisson, The Idea of Revolution in the Declaration of Independence
and the Constitution, in CONsTrrurrTONAL GovanrN',ENrr us AMERICA 411 (R. Collins ed. 1980).
282. P. Kusu.art, WATEROATE AND THE CoNsrrrurloN 7 (1978) (emphasis added). Justice William Paterson, a
leading Framer, declared, "The constitution is certain and fixed;... and can be revoked or altered only by the authority
that made it." Van Home v. Dorrance, 28 F. Cas. 1012, 1014 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795) (No. 16, 857). See also S. Adams,
Massachusetts Circular Letter, February 11, 1768 in DocuMENrrs OF AMmRIcAN HtSTORY 66 (H. Commager, 7th ed.
1963).
283. 4 DEuATEs IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF FEDERAL CONs'rrtrION 543 (J. Elliott
ed. 1827-30 & photo. reprint 1941).
284. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 176 (1803). See also Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.)
655 (1874): "The theory of our governments ... is opposed to the deposit of unlimited power anywhere." Id. at 663.
285. Marbsry v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 179-80 (1803).
286. JOHN MARSHAUL.'s DEFENSE OF McCuLLocH V. MARYLAND 209 (G. Gunther ed. 1969).
287. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 104 (1958).
288. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 203 (1970). It needs to be remembered, as Justice Daniel vigorously stated
in the License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847), that "whether the decision of the court in such cases be itself
binding.., must depend upon its conformity with, or its warrant from, the constitution. It cannot be correctly held, that
a decision, merely because it be by the Supreme Court, is to override alike the constitution and the laws both of the States
and of the United States." Id. at 613 (Daniel, J., concurring). (For similar remarks by Justices Douglas, Frankfurter, and
Chief Justice Burger, see R. BERGER, GOvERNMEr BY JtDIciARY, supra note 43, at 297 n.57). One hundred years later
Justice Brandeis, borrowing the words of Justice Holmes, branded the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1
(1842), an "'unconstitutional assumption of powers by courts of the United States which no lapse of time or respectable
array of opinion should make us hesitate to correct."' Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938) (quoting Black &




Nor should it ever be lost sight of, that the government of the United States is one of
limited and enumerated powers, and that a departure from the true import and sense of its
powers is pro tanto the establishment of a new constitution. It is doing for the people what
they have not chosen to do for themselves. It is usurping the functions of a
legislator .... 289
In the upshot, White concludes, "the choices made by Warren and other advocates
of judicial liberalism [i.e., revisionism] appear less as ordained principles of justice
and more as vulnerable policy judgments"2O--judgments the Constitution reserved
to the people and their legislative representatives.
To remain attached to these fundamental principles of our democratic system is
not to be "encumbered with professional cant"; 291 to condemn Warren's reversal of
the framers' exclusion of suffrage and segregation is not "professional cant."
Although White concedes that Warren's ideal of "equality of opportunity" was not
"explicitly codified in the Constitution' '2 92 -in fact it was repeatedly rejected by the
framers of the fourteenth amendment-he concludes that "[tlhe most eloquent state-
ment of a white supremacist interpretation of the equal protection clauses could not be
likely to gain much current acceptance. . . . [T]he premise would be considered
flawed.' '293 Those whose attachment to integrity of the Constitution overrides their
social aspirations are not to be kissed off as "white supremacists."-2 94 Nor is a
demand that the Court observe constitutional "limits" a "flawed premise." Would
busing or the bar against school prayer "gain much current acceptance"? At bottom,
White and Sager advocate judicial squatter sovereignty; having preempted territory
that is not theirs, the Court's preemption is irreversible.295
It is unfortunate that the struggle against the substitution of the Justices' personal
predilections for the text and original understanding of the framers has fallen to
Senator Jesse Helms and his ilk. But scripture is not discredited because it is cited by
the devil. It is a reproach to the liberal academicians, for whom the rule of law had
been central, that they have abandoned their standard. For myself, I insist with
Charles Mcllwain that "[tihe two fundamental correlative elements of constitutional-
ism for which all lovers of liberty must yet fight are the legal limits to arbitrary power
289. 1 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, § 426 (5th ed. 1891).
290. G. WHnrrE, supra note 17, at 349 (emphasis added).
291. "Warren kept his eye on the essentials of a case-the essential facts, the essential justice of the situation-and
in so doing reminded us that when the law gets encumbered with professional cant, it ceases to approximate reality and
loses its reason for being." Id. at 367. By such statements White renders vain his disclaimer that his "attempt to elucidate
Warren's jurisprudence should not be taken as an attempt to defend it in any particular." Id. at 230.
292. Id. at 170.
293. Id. at 364. Taking issue with Michael Perry's statement-"Certainly not many would take issue with... the
Court's.. . disestablishment of laws and other official practices aimed at maintaining racial segregation"--, Ira Lupu
tartly comments, "It requires the rosiest or most disingenuous distortion to make such an assertion in the face of the
turbulence of school desegregation efforts since 1954." Lupu, Constitutional Theory and the Search for the Workable
Premise, 8 U. DAYToN L. Ran. 579, 593 (1983). See also Berger, The Scope of Judicial Review: An Ongoing Debate, 6
HAsnrqos CON ST. L.Q. 527, 583 (1979).
294. In 1942 1 wrote of a decision that responded to my predilections that I liked it no better when the Court read
them into the Constitution than when the Four Horsemen read in theirs. Berger, Constructive Contempt: A Post-Mortem, 9
U. Cm. L. REv. 602, 604-05, 642 (1942).
295. For some salty comments on such views, see Bridwell, The Scope of Judicial Review: A Dirge for the Theorists
of Majority Rule, 31 S.C.L. Rsv. 617, 632-35, 653 (1980).
1983]
642 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 44:611
and a complete political responsibility of government to the governed. ,296 Warren
was contemptuous of such limits, and the life-tenured Justices are virtually un-
accountable. Sager would make them invulnerable. 297
V. APPENDIX
In a symposium 298 on Michael Perry's recent book, 29 9 which appeared after this
article was in the hands of the editors, one activist referred to "existing constitutional
doubt about jurisdiction removals.'' 3 ° Another stated that the legitimacy of the
congressional power "is opposed by the substantial weight of scholarly opinion." 30 1
Neither referred to the unbroken string of Supreme Court pronouncements, stretching
from 1796 to the present day, 30 2 that recognize the plenary power of Congress.
Instead, a commentator cited a 1953 article by Henry Hart,303 overlooking that in
1962 the Court approved Ex parte McCardle unmoved by Hart's theorizing.3 0 4 Activ-
ists are defending the Court in contradiction of its own pronouncements. Disregard
of the long line of precedents is the more remarkable given Ira Lupu's emphasis
that Perry introduces "the possibility of radical discontinuity," departing "from
the principles that have previously governed analogous [here the very same]
matters," a "rip in the seamless web."- 315 What could be more radically dis-
continuous than the Court's resort in 1972 to the cruel and unusual punishments
clause in the teeth of universal attachment for 183 years before Furman v. Georgia30 6
to death penalties for murder and rape. 30 7 Or the Court's saddling upon a state
support of out-of-state indigents immediately upon their arrival, thereby scrapping
the contrary practice of 600 years. 308 Or its substitution in 1970 of the six-man jury
for the twelve-man jury to which the Founders were attached and that was rooted in
centuries-old English tradition. 30 9 The "web," in truth, is being "ripped" by "those
296. C. MCILWAIN, CONSTITUTIONALtSM: ANCIENT AND MODERN 146 (rev. ed. 1947).
297. But see supra text accompanying note 25.
298. Judicial Review and the Constitution-the Text and Beyond, 8 U. DAYTON L. REv. 443 (1983).
299. M. PERRY, supra note 13.
300. Lupu, supra note 293, at 616.
301. Tushnet, Legal Realism, Structural Review, and Prophecy, 8 U. DAYTON L. REv. 809, 813 (1983). Tushnet
proffers no count of noses. Among those who recognize the congressional power are Charles Black, Michael Perry, and
Herbert Wechsler. See Berger, Michael Perry's FunctionalJustificationforJudicialActivism, 8 U. DAYTON L. REv. 465,
503 (1983); Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 1001, 1005 (1965); Lusky, Book Review, 6
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 403,406, 412 (1979); Leedes, The Supreme Court Mess, 57 Tax. L. REv. 1361, 1442-43 (1979);
R. BERGER, DEATH PENALTts, supra note 10, at 153-72.
302. Berger, Michael Perry's Functional Justification for Judicial Activism, 8 U. DAYTON L. Rsv. 465, 504-05
(1983).
303. Alexander, Painting Without the Numbers: Noninterpretive Judicial Review, 8 U. DAYTON L. REv. 447, 455
(1983).
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enthusiastic about the modem Court's work product," 310 a part of the activist drive
"to protect the legacy of the Warren Court."
311
A significant portion of that "legacy" is the extraconstitutional rights created by
the Court, which activists acknowledge are without constitutional warrant.3 12 In
Perry's words, "there is neither a textual nor a historical justification ... for nonin-
terpretivist review in human rights cases.' '313 Lupu therefore begs the question in
urging that jurisdiction withdrawal "is designed to prohibit the exercise of rights
which the Supreme Court has been willing to protect, and to deprive those who seek
to exercise such rights of any judicial forum for their vindication." 314 That the Court
is "willing to protect" such rights does not confer upon the Court power that was
withheld in the Constitution.315 Nor is it opprobrious to deprive the Court of jurisdic-
tion to enforce such unconstitutional constructs. The specification in article II of
cases "arising under this Constitution" excludes cases drawn outside its bounds, for
as Hamilton explained, the judicial authority extends to "certain cases particularly
specified," marking "the precise limits, beyond which the federal courts cannot
extend their jurisdiction.",3 16 One may agree with Lupu that the "arising under"
jurisdiction is "coterminous with the enumeration of sources of 'supreme law' in
article VI. If decisional products of noninterpretivist review are not 'law' for su-
premacy clause purposes, they cannot be 'law' for purposes of permitting an article
III court to hear disputes arising out of interpretation of those decisional pro-
ducts. ,317 Precisely. Hamilton wrote in Federalist No. 33 that the clause "expressly
confines this supremacy to laws made pursuant to the Constitution"; federal acts
which are not pursuant thereto but are "invasions of the residuary powers of the
smaller societies ... will be merely acts of usurpation, and will deserve to be treated
as such." 3 18 Acts of usurpation by the judiciary, the branch which Hamilton noted
was "less than nothing," 3 19 would hardly stand higher than those of the legislative
branch.
Lupu urges that for "state courts to ignore the entire corpus of American obscen-
ity law, as a response to an act of congressional jurisdiction control, would simply be
lawless," 32 ° overlooking that federal imposition of first amendment requirements on
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311. Tushnet, supra note 301, at 8 11. Paul Brest adjured his activist brethren "simply to acknowledge that most of
our writings [about judicial review] are not political theory but advocacy scholarship-amicus briefs ultimately designed
to persuade the Court to adopt our various notions of the public good." Brest, supra note 14, at 1109.
312. See supra note 44 and accompanying text; see also Berger, Michael Perry's Functional Justification for
Judicial Activism, 8 U. DAYTON L. REv. 465, 466 n.12 (1983).
313. M. PERRY, supra note 13, at 91.
314. Lupu, supra note 293, at 617.
315. "The framers did not intend article II to empower a federal judge to invalidate legislation simply because he
decides that, beyond its limitations, the Constitution should protect a claimant's rights." Leedes, The Supreme Court
Mess, 57 Toc. L. REv. 1361, 1385 (1979).
316. THE FEDEAusr No. 81, at 541 (A. Hamilton) (Mod. Libr. ed. 1937).
317. Lupu, supra note 293, at 615.
318. THE FEn E.Rusr No. 33, at 202 (A. Hamilton) (Mod. Libr. ed. 1937) (emphasis in original).
319. THE FEDEAsr No. 78, at 504 n.* (A. Hamilton) (Mod. Libr. ed. 1937).
320. Lupu, supra note 293, at 613.
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
the states is itself "lawless," 32 1 and that under Erie Railroad v. Tompkins322 it is
never too late so to hold. Notwithstanding a congressional removal of jurisdiction,
Lupu urges state court review of a school prayer law to avoid, among other things,
"the corrosive pressures on state courts to move with the popular tide rather than
remain bound by authoritative national precedent. ' 323 A precedent that arrogates
unconferred power should not be regarded as "authoritative." Popular majority will
is to be thwarted only when the Constitution so demands. Given nationwide resis-
tance to the school prayer decisions, 324 why should state courts cram Supreme Court
predilections down the throat of an unwilling people after Congress withdraws its
jurisdiction to do so?
Lupu argues that considerations of "supremacy and uniformity" require state
courts to follow the Supreme Court decisions, nothwithstanding withdrawal of jur-
isdiction to decide such cases in the future. There is no need to recapitulate the facts,
set forth in the body of this article, that undermine the "uniformity" argument. 325
They demonstrate that the Framers themselves departed from unformity and did not
regard it as indispensable. I would add that as between judicial usurpation and
"uniformity" the Framers would have chosen to keep the Court within bounds at the
cost of uniformity. 326 For nothing exceeded the Founders' dread of unrestrained
power. 327 In the context of the Court's death penalty, school prayer, and obscenity
decisions, it may be expected that the state courts, relieved of Supreme Court appel-
late coercion, will pretty uniformly return to the thwarted state policies, thus achiev-
ing the much extolled "uniformity." Moreover, the power of Congress to exclude
state courts from decisions of federal matters has long been accepted. From the
beginning, Charles Alan Wright wrote, Congress has "provided that in certain in-
stances the jurisdiction of the federal courts shall be exclusive of the courts of the
several states.' 328 One such instance is the provision of section 3 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866 that "the district courts ... shall have, exclusively of the courts of the
several States, cognizance of all crimes and offences committed against the pro-
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visions of this act.' 329 Such precedents are buttressed by section 5 of the fourteenth
amendment-"Congress shall have power to enforce" the provisions of the
amendment. 330 Were state courts to proceed in despite of Congress' omission to
delegate enforcement power to, or to withdraw it from, the federal and state courts,
they would take over power conferred upon Congress alone.
By virtue of the binding force of the supremacy clause, state judges are bound by
the Constitution and the laws pursuant thereto. But in the New York Convention
Hamilton assured the ratifiers that "the laws of Congress are restricted to a certain
sphere, and when they depart from this sphere, they are no longer supreme and
binding." 331 Judicial grafts of extraconstitutional claims on the Constitution stand no
higher than statutory invasions of the states' "residuary powers." The legislature,
not the courts, was the darling of the Founders; 332 it is the Constitution, not judicial
encrustations, that bind state judges. 333 The Framers hardly contemplated that the
Court could bind states by unconstitutional decisions. Judicial review was conceived
in terms of curbing excesses by the other branches, 334 policing the constitutional
boundaries, 335 not as a warrant for excesses by the Court itself. Of what use were
Hamilton's assurances that the "'usurpations of the Supreme Court. . . will [not] be
uncontrollable and remediless,"' that it could be impeached for "usurpations on the
authority of the legislature," 336 and a fortiori for the even graver invasion of rights
reserved to the states, if the decisions which gave rise to removal of jurisdiction
would continue to bind the states. They sought protection against encroachment on
their reserved rights, not merely removal of offenders while leaving the harm in
place.
Who shall decide whether a Supreme Court decision is extraconstitutional?
Manifestly, the Court should not sit as judge of its own derelictions. But in Cooper v.
Aaron3 37 the Court, citing Marbury v. Madison, stressed that "the federal judiciary is
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supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution," that "the interpretation of
the Fourteenth Amendment enunciated ... in the Brown case is the supreme law of
the land, and Art. VI of the Constitution makes it of binding effect on the States,"
and that state officials are "solemnly committed by oath . . . 'to support of this
Constitution.' "338 Marbury is not a happy citation; Chief Justice Marshall declared
that if the Constitution is not "unchangeable by ordinary means .... then written
constitutions are absurd attempts, on the part of the people, to limit a power, in its
own nature illimitable."-339 That judicial revision was an "ordinary means" is
evidenced by his statement that the judicial power "cannot be the assertion of a right
to change that instrument. ,340 Then too, in holding that Congress may not enlarge
the "original" jurisdiction of the Court, Marbury was enforcing the unambiguous
text of the Constitution, not a judicial importation, whereas Brown overturned the
framers' plain intention to leave segregation to the states;341 and as Warren's disciple,
G. Edward White, attests, he grafted on the fourteenth amendment his own senti-
ments, having no roots in the Constitution and in despite of popular sentiment. 34' As
regards the "oath" to "support the Constitution," that does not require respect for
judicial action which, in defiance of the Constitution, invades the states' "residuary
powers." Whatever the case when a state, standing alone, resists a Supreme Court
mandate, as in Cooper, congressional removal of the Court's jurisdiction alters the
situation and, in my judgment, fortifies the state.
In essence, activists would bind the state courts to enforce unconstitutional and
unpopular policies which Congress, as authorized by article III, has disabled the
Court from enforcing. Neither the supremacy clause nor considerations of uniformity
constrain state courts to do so. Obedience to the Court flowed from its power of
compulsion on review. With that no longer operative, state courts may return to
effectuation of state policy in local matters. As regards jurisdiction, the last word is
for Congress. Sanford Levinson is "willing to assign Congress the last word" be-
cause "[d]emocratic theory requires ... that the stopping point be the most demo-
cratic branch of the polity, unless special reasons can be offered to defend a different
theory. " 34 3 Where Levinson relies upon political theory, I would summon the terms
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of article III, which, in conferring upon Congress power over jurisdiction of the
federal courts, gave it the last word.3 4 No activist speculations have persuasively
diminished the unequivocal text.
Several symposiasts, as if to show the absurdity of the jurisdiction removal
power, argue that if it can remove jurisdiction it should be able to revise the decisions
of the Court as well. 34 5 The Court itself, however, drew a distinction between those
two powers in United States v. Klein.34 6 Sanford Levinson observes that one "might
feel differently if the text stated explicitly that Congress shall have no authority to
revise Constitution-based judgments of the Supreme Court, but, of course, there is no
such patch of text." 347 It would be superfluous. The powers of the federal govern-
ment are only those that have been granted; what was not granted was reserved to the
states. 348 In addition, there is the implication that the express grant of authority to
control jurisdiction excludes powers not mentioned. Then too, Hamilton stated in
Federalist No. 81 that a "legislature ... cannot reverse a determination once made
in a particular case,"-34 9 noting, however, in the same No. 81 that "usurpations by
the Supreme Court ... will [not] be uncontrollable and remediless. '"350 Such dis-
tinctions were appreciated by Daniel Webster, who argued in Gibbons v. Ogden that
[i]f Congress were to pass an act expressly revoking or annulling this New-York grant,
such an act would be wholly useless and inoperative. If the New-York grant be
... inconsistent with, any constitutional power which Congress has exercised, then,
... the grant is nugatory and void, necessarily, and by reason of the supremacy of the
law of Congress. 35 1
One who argues from a power of removal to a congressional power to revise de-
cisions could equally maintain that because a state statute is inconsistent with a
congressional power, Congress may annul it. Professor Felix Frankfurter, a leading
student of constitutional law and federal jurisdiction, proposed an amendment that
would authorize Congress to overrule Supreme Court decisions under certain
circumstances, 352 recognizing thereby that article III does not authorize such revi-
sion. Perhaps such "niceties" carry little weight with activists, who measure all
things by the result. But limits on power remain important to those of us who cling to
a democratic system.
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